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INREM JURISDICTION IN CYBERSPACE
Thomas R. Lee*
Abstract: "Cyberpirates" incorporating variations on famous trademarks in Internet domain
names often attempt to insulate themselves from service of process by providing fhlse and
incomplete information in registration materials. Holders of prominent trademarks are often left
without an effective remedy because of the logistical difficulty of identifying cyberpirates and
personally serving a multitude of complaints in far-flung jurisdictions. This Article examines a
potential solution to the problem, whereby the trademark holder files an in rem action against the
Internet domain names themselves on the theory that domain names incorporating their famous
trademarks violate the Lanham Act and are subject to cancellation and transfer to the trademark
owner. Recently, however, a federal court dismissed one such in rem complaint for lack of
personal jurisdiction, citing statutory and constitutional concerns. This Article examines the
propriety ofthe in rem solution to the problem ofcyberpiracy. After tracing the Supreme Court's
treatment of in rem jurisdiction from Pennoyer v. Neff through Shaffer v. Heitner and to the
present, the Article carefully examines the statutory and constitutional issues presented by this
novel application of a longstanding procedural mechanism. Specifically, this Article examines
the constitutionality of in rem jurisdiction after Shaffer and evaluates the question of where a
domain name may be deemed to have its "situs" forjurisdictional purposes.
"With the rapid explosion of Web sites hawking everything from
pornography to Bibles, competition for the attention of the world's
estimated 147 million Web users is fierce. Site creators spare no
strategy to get noticed-and trading on famous names, which are
queried relentlessly by Web surfers, is a key one. "'
"Existing mechanisms for resolving conflicts between trademark
owners and domain name holders are often viewed as expensive,
cumbersome and ineffective. The sheer number ofinstances precludes
many trademark owners from filing multiple suits in one or more
national courts. ,
2
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University of Chicago; B.A. 1988, Brigham Young University. Special thanks to Gregory D. Phillips of
Howard, Phillips & Andersen, outside trademark counsel for Porsche Cars, whose brainchild of a lawsuit
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2. World Intellectual Property Org., FinalReport ofthe WIPO InternetDomain NameProcess 131
(visited Apr. 30,1999) <http://ecommerce.wipo.int/domains/processeng/finareporthtml> [hereinafter
WIPO Report].
Washington Law Review
The Internet explosion of the 1990s has opened up a multitude of
opportunities for enhanced communication and commerce. It also has
introduced new problems. One such problem is the tension between the
largely unregulated system of registering Internet domain names-the
human-friendly textual addresses that permit Internet users to access
Internet sites easily-and the highly regulated system that protects
intellectual property rights.3 Because the value of a web site derives from its
getting noticed, and because web surfers generally search by entering
famous names, web sites are frequently established under domain names
that incorporate variations on prominent trademarks and corporate names.
Existing legal mechanisms have been ineffective in resolving this
problem for many reasons, including the inefficiency of filing multiple suits
in numerous far-flung jurisdictions and the difficulty (sometimes the
impossibility) of identifying and locating the domain-name holder for
service of process. This Article analyzes this recent problem and proposes a
novel application of an existing solution. If the infringing Internet domain
names can be characterized as personal property within the control of a
single court, the domain names themselves should be susceptible to being
named as defendants in an in rem proceeding in that court. This proposal
may provide a solution to trademark holders who otherwise might be left
without a remedy because an in rem action may proceed without complying
with the strict requirements of personal service of process that are
associated with in personam actions.4
3. For a discussion of the substantive trademark-infringement and dilution issues presented by this
conflict, see generally Dan L. Burk, Trademarks Along the Infobahn: A First Look at the Emerging Law
of Cybermarks, 1 Richmond J.L. & Tech. 1 (Apr. 10, 1995) <http://www.richmond.edu/jolttvlil/
burk.html>; Jennifer R. Dupre, A Solution to the Problem? Trademark Infringement and Dilution by
Domain Names: Bringing the Cybervorld in Line with the "Real" World, 87 Trademark Rep. 613
(1997); Gary W. Hamilton, Trademarks on the Internet: Confusion, Collusion orDilution, 4 Tex. Intell.
Prop. L.J. 1 (1995); Ughetta Manzone, Panavision International, L.P. v. Toeppen, 13 Berkeley Tech. L.J.
249 (1998); Kenneth Sutherlin Dueker, Note, Trademark Law Lost in Cyberspace: Trademark
Protection for Internet Addresses, 9 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 483 (1996); J.W. Marcovitz, Note,
RONALD@MCDONALDS. COM-"Owning a Bitchin"" Corporate Trademarkas an Internet Address-
Infringement?, 17 Cardozo L. Rev. 85 (1995). For an evaluation of the related issue of whether use of a
trademark in an Internet "meta-tag" may be protected under the trademark defense of fair use, see
generally Katherine E. Gasparek, Comment, Applying the Fair Use Defense in Traditional Trademark
Infringement and Dilution Cases to Internet Meta Tagging orLinking Cases, 7 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 787
(1999).
4. Although the in rem question addressed herein is a novel one, a substantial body of commentary
has addressed the problems arising when courts apply in personam jurisdictional standards to Internet
activity. See generally Dan L. Burk, Federalism in Cyberspace, 28 Conn. L. Rev. 1095 (1996); Dan L.
Burk, Jurisdiction in a World Without Borders, 1 Va. J.L. & Tech. 3 (Spring 1997)
<http://vjolt.student.virginia.edu/graphics/vol l/home_art3.html>; William S. Byassee, Jurisdiction of
Vol. 75:97, 2000
In Rem Jurisdiction in Cyberspace
Part I of this Article offers background discussion on the nature of a
domain name and on the dilemma faced by holders of famous trademarks
whose marks are coopted by cyberpirates and incorporated into confusing
domain names. Part II explains that two prominent trademark holders have
filed in rem actions in response to this dilemma, naming allegedly
infringing domain names as defendants; that section also explains why a
recent district court decision granted a motion to dismiss on the ground that
in rem decisions are not available under the Lanham Act.' Part III offers
background on the U.S. Supreme Court's treatment of in rem proceedings,
and Part IV analyzes the novel application of this longstanding procedural
mechanism in the face of a number of objections that might be raised to it.
I. INTERNET DOMAIN NAMES: PROPERTY IN CYBERSPACE
"The Internet can be very simply described as a, or the, network of
networks. That simple technical description, however, lacks the
eloquence to speak of the profound ways in which the Internet is
affecting the way in which we communicate with each other, the way
we express ourselves, the way we learn, the way we do business and
the way in which we interact culturally. "6
A. History and Logistics ofDomain Names on the Internet
The "network of networks" began as the network of the U.S. Department
of Defense (DoD). In the 1960s, DoD's Advanced Research Projects
Agency (DARPA) began funding research to develop communications
networking and packet-switching technology that it used in establishing its
Cyberspace: Applying Real World Precedent to the Virtual Community, 30 Wake Forest L. Rev. 197
(1995); Cynthia L. Counts & C. Amanda Martin, Libel in Cyberspace: A Framework for Addressing
Liability and Jurisdictional Issues in This New Frontier, 59 Alb. L. Rev. 1083 (1996); Brian Covotta,
Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet: An Introduction, 13 Berkeley Tech. LJ. 265 (1998); David R.
Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders-The Rise ofLawin Cyberspace, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1367 (1996).
5. See Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. v. PORSCH.COM, 51 F. Supp. 2d 707, 712-13 (E.D. Va. 1999).
6. WIPO Report, supra note 2, 1. For further discussion of the history of the Internet, see generally'
Katie Hafier & Matthew Lyon, Where Wizards Stay up Late: The Origins ofthe Internet (1996); Barry
M. Leiner et al., A Brief History of the Internet (last modified Feb. 20, 1998) <http://www.isoc.org/
internet-history/brief.html> (providing history of Internet as written by several prominent architects of
Internet); Bruce Sterling, Internet, Mag. Fantasy & Sci. Fiction, Feb. 1993, at 99.
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own network, known as ARPANET.7 Subsequently, ARPANET was linked
to networks established by various other government agencies, universities,
and research facilities.' At the heart of the burgeoning Internet was a list of
numerical addresses-Internet Protocol (IP) numbers-assigned to each
host participant, which enabled users to establish links with participating
hosts.
DARPA managed ARPANET and the expanding network of hosts linked
to it through the early 1980s.9 Although the Internet was used primarily for
research purposes throughout this period, the task of maintaining a list of IP
numbers eventually became onerous." In an effort to simplify the process of
identifying the IP address of a participating host, DARPA and its
contractors developed a Domain Name System (DNS), whereby a host
would be assigned a "human-friendly address... in a form that is easy to
remember or to identify" to correspond to the host's IP number."
The DNS evolved into a domain name system composed of two domain
levels: a top-level and a second-level domain. Top-level domains (TLDs)
include generic TLDs (gTLDs) and country code TLDs (ccTLDs). 2 Until
recently, seven gTLDs were available: .com, .net, and .org, all of which are
"open" gTLDs in that any person or entity may register names within them;
and .int, .edu, .gov, and .mil, all of which are "restricted" gTLDs in that
they are available for registration only to international, educational,
governmental, and military entities. 3 Hundreds of ccTLDs are available,
each of which is composed of a two-letter country code derived from
Standard 3166 of the International Organization for Standardization, 4 such
as .au for Australia, .br for Brazil, .ca for Canada, and .jp for Japan. Some
7. See Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,741,31,741 (1998); Leiner et
al., supra note 6.
8. See 63 Fed. Reg. at 31,741; Hamilton, supra note 3, at 2.
9. See 63 Fed. Reg. at 31,741.
10. See id.
11. WIPO Report, supra note 2, 4.
12. See id. T 5; see also 63 Fed. Reg. at 31,742. For further discussion of the technical operation of the
domain-name system, see generally Ellen Rony & Peter Rony, The Domain Name Handbook: High
Stakes and Strategies in Cyberspace (1998).
13. See WIPO Report, supra note 2, 9 6. The .edu gTLD is restricted to four-year, degree-granting
colleges and universities; .gov is restricted to agencies of the U.S. federal government; and .mil is
restricted to the U.S. military. See id.
14. See id. 7.
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ccTLDs are open; others are restricted, for example, to users domiciled
within the particular country. 5
Second-level domains are the characters immediately to the left of the
top-level domain. They commonly incorporate words, names, brands, or
trademarks that are "easy to remember and to identify without the need to
resort to the underlying IP numeric address." 6 Domain names have
acquired special importance as there is no satisfactory Internet equivalent to
a telephone directory or directory assistance and Internet users can often
guess at domain names.
The transition from ARPANET to the Internet explosion of the 1990s
took an important turn in 1987, when IBM, MCI, and Merit-under an
award from the National Science Foundation-developed NSFNET, a
national high-speed network that "provided a 'backbone' to connect other
networks serving more than 4,000 research and educational institutions
throughout the country."' 7 A second turning point came in 1992, when the
U.S. Congress authorized commercial activity on NSFNET,"8 thus
"facilitat[ing] connections between NSFNET and newly forming
commercial network service providers" and "paving the way for today's
Internet.""9 The ensuing Internet explosion has been impressive. From 1990
to 1997, the number of Internet users grew from an estimated one million to
about seventy million.2" From the period of 1993 to 1996, the number of
Internet hosts in Europe increased by about 600%,21 while the growth in
Africa and Asia was about 840%.?
The explosive growth in Internet use created increasing demands on the
management of the developing DNS after assuming responsibility for
15. See id.
16. Id. 10.
17. 63 Fed. Reg. at 31,742.
18. See Scientific and Advanced-TechnologyActof 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-476, § 4, 106 Stat. 2297,
2300 (1992) (codified as amended at42 U.S.C. § 1862(a) (1994)).
19. 63 Fed. Reg. at 31,742.
20. See Global Internet Project, Internet Foundations: Breaking Technology Bottlenecks (last
modified Sept. 8,1998) <http://www.gip.org/giplO.htm>; WIPOReport, supra note 2,1 2(i). One study
projects worldwide Internet usership of 250 to 300 million by the end of the year 2000. See Donald J.
Karl, Comment, State Regulation ofAnonymous Internet UseAfterACLU ofGeorgia v. Miller, 30 Ariz.
St. L.J. 513, 514 & n.10 (1998).
21. See Global Internet Project, supra note 20; WIPO Report, supra note 2, 2(i).
22. See World Info. Tech. & Servs. Alliance, Digital Planet-The Global Information Economy 20
(1998) (available at http://www.witsa.org) [hereinafter WITSA Report]; WIPO Report, supra note 2, 2(i).
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coordinating and finding the management of the nonmilitary portion of the
Internet in 1991, NSF solicited proposals for the private provision of
domain-name registration services.23 At the end of 1992, NSF entered into
an agreement with Network Solutions, Inc. (NSI) of Herndon, Virginia,
under which NSI agreed to manage the registration, coordination, and
maintenance of the Internet domain-name system.24 Under its contract with
NSF, NSI has registered gTLDs on a first-come, first-served basis,
maintained a directory linking domain names with the IP numbers assigned
to participating hosts, and maintained the authoritative database of Internet
registrations.5
Connectivity through the DNS is ensured by operation of a "root server"
system composed of thirteen file servers containing extensive databases
listing all domain names.26 Although the various file servers are maintained
by different organizations, NSI operates and maintains the "A" root server,
which "maintains the authoritative root database and replicates changes to
the other root servers on a daily basis.' 27
The process of registering a domain name through NSI is inexpensive,
potentially anonymous, and virtually instantaneous. A registrant seeking to
register a domain name under a gTLD may contact NSI via the Internet,
execute an online Domain Name Registration Agreement, and secure
registration of a domain name in a matter of seconds. NSI's Registration
Agreement requires that the registrant provide the name of the organization
or person using the domain name, an administrative contact, a technical
contact, and a billing contact, and that the registrant provide the street
23. See 63 Fed. Reg. at 31,742.
24. See id.
25. See id. Upon expiration of its contract with NSI, the Commerce Department entered into an
agreement with the Interet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), a nonprofit entity
formed by leading Internet companies, under which ICANN and Commerce would jointly design and
develop procedures to transfer management of the domain-name system to the private sector and select
new registrars to compete with NSI. See Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Commerce Threatens to Weaken NSI's
Grip; Internet Address Manager Warned, Wash. Post, July 10, 1999, at E 1. Despite ICANN's entry on
the scene, NSI's ongoing, central role in the domain-name system was assured by Commerce's
agreement that NSI would retain control over key management functions such as the operation of the
"A" root server or master database of domain names in the .com, .org, and .net domains. See id. Pursuant
to ICANN's recommendations, five new registrars have been selected to compete with NSI and have
begun to do so on a test basis; full-scale competition is on hold while Commerce and NSI negotiate over
thorny issues such as the fee NSI may charge its rivals to manage addresses in the "A" root server. See id.
26. See 63 Fed. Reg. at 31,742.
27. Id.; see also Josh A. Goldfoot, Note, Antitrust Implications oflnternet Administration, 84 Va. L.
Rev. 909,915 (1998); Network Solutions, Inc., SEC Form S-l/A, at 10 (filed Sept. 25, 1997) (available
at http://www.sec.gov/index.html).
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address, phone number, fax number, and e-mail address for each such
organization or person.28 Although the Registration Agreement provides
that the registrant "represents that... the registration of the selected
Domain Name, to the best of the Registrant's knowledge, does not interfere
with or infiinge upon the rights of any third party," NSI permits the
registration of domain names on a "first-come, first-served" basis, does not
screen domain-name applications, and does not determine conflicting
claims of rights to use a domain name that includes a trademark.29 As a
result, the number of domain-name registrations has skyrocketed under
NSI's watch. A recent calculation estimated that about 21,000 new domain
names are registered every week.3" Total domain-name registrations have
increased from approximately 100,000 at the beginning of 1995 to over
7,000,000 at present.3 '
The data overwhelmingly demonstrate that a domain name mirroring or
including a corporate name or trademark is a valuable corporate asset in
facilitating communication with a customer base.
As commercial activities have increased on the Internet, domain
names have become part of the standard communication apparatus
used by businesses to identify themselves, their products and their
activities. Advertisements appearing in the media now routinely
include a domain name address, along with other means of
identification and communication, such as the corporate name,
trademark and telephone and facsimile numbers.32
28. Network Solutions, Inc., NSI Service Agreement 5 (visited Dec. 16, 1999)
<http.//www.networksolutions.com/legal/service-agreement.html> [hereinafterNSIServiceAgreement].
29. See Network Solutions, Inc., NSI Domain Name Dispute Policy % 1-2 (last modified Feb. 25,
1998) <http://www.networksolutions.comllegal/dispute-policy.html> [hereinafter Domain Name
Dispute Policy].
30. See WIPO Report, supra note 2, 9.
31. Seeid.-j9,45.
32. Id. 10; see also MTV Networks v. Curry, 867 F. Supp. 202, 203 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)
(explaining that "domain name mirroring a corporate name may be a valuable corporate asset, as it
facilitates communication with a customer base!); David M. Kelly & Christina J. Hieber, Untangling a
Web of Minimum Contacts: The Internet and Personal Jurisdiction in Trademark and Unfair
Competition Cases, 87 Trademark Rep. 526, 541 (1997) ("Companies place great significance on the
ability to use... logical identifiers [such as their corporate names or trademarks) because an Internet
user who wishes to find information about a particular company or product on the Internet usually
attempts to locate a web site by typing 'www.[company name or trademark].com."').
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B. Cybersquatting and Cyberpiracy
The current process of domain-name registration creates an environment
that is hospitable to two main forms of abuse. "Cybersquatting" is the
"deliberate, bad faith registration as domain names of well-known and other
trademarks in the hope of being able to sell the domain names to the owners
of those marks."33 High-profile squatting on domain names like
MCDONALDS.COM and MTV.COM helped to spawn a cottage industry
of cybersquatting.34 Newsday's Joshua Quittner's expos6 on the failure of
prominent corporations to register domain names incorporating prominent
trademarks included his own registration of mcdonalds.com and his
seeming invitation to further squatting in his article entitled Billions
Registered: Right Now, There Are No Rules to Keep You from Owning a
Bitchin' Corporate Name as Your Own Internet Address.35 Quittner's
invitation was embraced by many adherents, including the infamous
cybersquatter Dennis Toeppen, who registered DELTAAIRLINES.COM,
EDDIEBAUER.COM, NEIMAN-MARCUS.COM, and more than two
hundred other names incorporating famous and valuable trademarks.36
Although some early instances of cybersquatting were challenged in the
courts, the relatively unrestricted registration system described by Quittner
has largely continued, as most of the challenges ended in settlement and
none produced clear precedents condemning the practice. 37 By about mid-
1996, however, a few courts began issuing rulings in favor of trademark
holders, including a number of cases (such as Toeppen's) in which the
plaintiff asserted claims for dilution of a famous trademark under section
43(c) of the Lanham Act.38
33. NSI Service Agreement, supra note 28, T 23.
34. For a recent discussion ofthe industry and the impact ofthe WIPO Report on it, see Jeri Clausing,
Technology: A Challenge to Domain-Name Speculators, N.Y. Times, Apr. 5, 1999, at C4.
35. See Joshua Quittner, Billions Registered: Right Now, There Are No Rules to Keep You from
Owning a Bitchin' Corporate Name as Your Own Internet Address, Wired, Oct. 1994, at 54.
36. See Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1230 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
37. See International Trademark Ass'n, The Intersection of Trademarks and Domain Names-INTA
"White Paper, " 87 Trademark Rep. 668,682 (1997) (noting that "Kaplan, MTV, Avon and other early
cases were settled before substantive rulings by the courts on the infringement claims").
38. See id.; see also Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Taylor, 21 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1005 (D. Minn.
1998) (granting preliminary injunction against defendant's use ofPOST-IT.COM, POST-ITS.COM, and
IPOST-IT.COM, reasoning that such use would likely dilute plaintiff's "Post-it" mark); Cardservice
Int'l, Inc. v. McGee, 950 F. Supp. 737, 743 (E.D. Va. 1997) (awarding fees to plaintiffwhen defendant
violated preliminary injunction against use of any variation of"Cardservice" on Internet and ordering
defendant to delete registration of"cardservice.com" domain name); Intermatic, 947 F. Supp. at 1239,
1241 (enjoining Toeppen's registration of INTERMATIC.COM and finding that because "Toeppen's
Vol. 75:97, 2000
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A second form of abuse is "cyberpiracy," the practice of registering
domain names that incorporate variations on famous trademarks for the
purpose of "tak[ing] unfair advantage of the reputation attached to those
marks."'39 Such abuse creates the risk that "consumers may be misled about
the source of the product or service offered on the Internet,"4 or at least that
consumers may initially be lured to a web site by the famous-sounding
domain name.4' As with cybersquatting, early cases of cyberpiracy went
undetected or unrestricted by formal rulings in the courts. For example,
Kaplan sued its main competitor Princeton Review for having registered
"kaplan.com" as a link to a web site to advertise Princeton Review's own
examination preparation services and to post disparaging comments about
Kaplan.42 The case ended in a settlement after arbitration.43 Landmark
precedents condemning piracy of this sort-particularly in cases where the
defendant used a confusing domain name as a link to a web site posting
pornographic or other offensive material-were not handed down until
1996.44
intention to arbitrage the 'intermatic.com' domain name constitute[d] a commercial use," it sustained
summary judgment on plaintiff's dilution claims).
39. WTPO Report, supra note 2, 23.
40. Management of Interet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,741,31,746 (1998).
41. An analogous form of initial-interest confusion has been acknowledged in other contexts to
sustain a claim for trademark infiingement even when it is dispelled after closer examination. See Dr.
Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books U.S.A., 109 F.3d 1394, 1405 (9th Cir. 1997); Mobil Oil Corp. v.
Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254,257-58 (2d Cir. 1987). There is no apparent reason why such
confusion should not be sufficient in this context as well. See, e.g., Brookfield Communications, Inc. v.
West Coast Entertainment Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1061-65 (9th Cir. 1999).
42. See Stanley Kaplan v. Princeton Review, Inc., No.94 Civ. 1604 (MGC) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9,1994).
For further discussion of the Kaplan case, see Patricia Alex, E-Mail Robbery on Information
Superhighway: Kaplan Was Victim of Rival, Record, Oct. 6, 1994, at A3; Jared Sandberg, Princeton
Review Must Drop "Kaplan'E-mailAddress, PrivateArbitrator Rules, Wall St. J., Oct. 6,1994, at B8.
43. See Joshua Quittner, Life in Cyberspace: You Deserve a Break Today, Newsday, Oct. 7, 1994, at
A5 (noting also that Kaplan initially refused Princeton Review's offer to settle in exchange for case of
beer, thus sparking Princeton Review's President's response that Kaplan had "no sense of humor, no
vision, and no beer").
44. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Fed'n ofAm., Inc. v. Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1430 (S.D.N.Y.
1997) (enjoining defendant's registration of domain name PLANNEDPARENTHOOD.COM as link to
web page that set forth defendant Catholic radio host's anti-abortion positions and literature on ground
that such site created likelihood of confusion with plaintiff); Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Akkaoui, 40
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1836 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (granting preliminary injunction against ADULTSRUS.COM
or any other colorable imitation of plaintiff's mark for Interet site and reasoning that use of such
domain names tarnishes plaintiff's "Toys 'R' Us" and "Kids 'R' Us" trademarks); Hasbro, Inc. v.
Interet Entertainment Group, Ltd., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1479 (W.D. Wash. 1996) (issuing preliminary
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Unfortunately, even the clear condemnation of cyberabuse by the federal
courts has done little to put an end to the practice. One reason stems from
the unsurprising fact that cyberpirates engaging in the above practices are
reluctant to disclose their true identity and location.45 Because the
registration process is completely automated, it facilitates the cyberpirates'
goal of anonymity. In order to insulate themselves from liability and to
interfere with service of legal process, many registrants provide fraudulent
or fictitious names and/or addresses.46 Other registrants create offshore
corporations to register domain names. Still others assign their domain
names to unidentifiable entities after registering them.47
For these and other reasons, the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO) has recognized that "[t]he absence of reliable and accurate contact
details [about domain name registrants] leads to a situation in
which.., intellectual property rights can be infringed with impunity on a
highly visible public medium."48 Indeed, WIPO has deemed traditional
"mechanisms for resolving conflicts between trademark owners and domain
name holders" to be "ineffective," precisely because of the "sheer number
of instances" of infringement of trademarks by far-flung domain-name
registrants intent on concealing their identities.49 Because such mechanisms
generally presuppose an in personam lawsuit initiated by personal service
of process on the defendant," the holder of a prominent trademark that has
injunction against registration of CANDYLAND.COM as domain name for web site offering explicit
adult materials and finding plaintiff's dilution claim likely to succeed on merits).
45. See Wipo Report, supra note 2, ii (noting that "the collection and availability of accurate and
reliable contact details of domain-name holders is an essential tool for facilitating the protection of
intellectual property rights on a borderless and otherwise anonymous medium," and that "[s]uch contact
details provide the principal means by which intellectual property owners can go about the process of
enforcing their rights"); id. 64 ("Without accurate and reliable contact details, the task of assigning
responsibility for activities on the Internet is vastly complicated."); id. 322 ("The lack of reliable
contact details often is highlighted as a major obstacle in the resolution of the problem.").
46. See id. 322 (noting that trademark holders indicate that they "often do find that the registrant's
information that is provided [to NSI] is completely unreliable") (quotation omitted).
47. See infra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
48. World Intellectual Property Org., Interim Report of the WIPO Internet Domain Name Process
47 (last modified Dec. 23, 1998) <http://ecommerce.wipo.int/domains/process/eng/rfc.3.html>.
49. WIPO Report, supra note 2, $ 131.
50. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e) (authorizing plaintiff to effect service on individual "pursuant to the law
of the state in which the district court is located" or "by delivering a copy of the summons and of the
complaint to the individual personally or by leaving copies thereof at the individual's dwelling house or
usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein"); Fed. R. Civ.
P. 4(h) (authorizing plaintiff to effect service on corporation or association "in the manner prescribed for
individuals.., or by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to an officer [or other
agent] authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process").
Vol. 75:97, 2000
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been the recurrent target of cyberpirates may find itself without the logistics
or resources to protect its intellectual property from such infringement. The
forthcoming addition of new gTLDs in the DNS threatens to exacerbate the
problem, as an increasing array of platforms is opened for the misap-
propriation of variations on famous trademarks.5' A possible solution is
proposed and analyzed in the balance of this Article.
II. THE PORSCHE AND BELL ATLANTIC SUITS
Two holders of prominent trademarks recently have attempted to effect a
novel solution to this problem.52 In early 1999, Porsche Cars North
America, Inc. and Dr. Ing. h.c.F. Porsche AG (collectively, "Porsche") filed
an action in rem against 128 domain names that incorporated variations on
51. As WIPO indicated in its Final Report:
The evidence shows that the experience of the last five years in gTLDs has led to numerous
instances of abusive domain name registrations and, consequently, to consumer confusion and an
undermining of public trust in the Intemet. It has also led to the necessity for intellectual property
owners to invest substantial human and financial resources in defending their interests.... In view
of past experience, intellectual property owners are very apprehensive about the introduction of new
gTLDs and the possible repetition in the new gTLDs of that experience.
WIPO Report, supra note 2, % x-xi.
52. A number of alternative solutions have been offered by various parties. WIPO, for one, has
proposed that the domain-name registration agreement include a proviso that "the provision of
inaccurate or unreliable information by the domain-name holder, or the failure to update information,"
shall constitute a material breach of the agreement and a basis for cancellation, id. 119, and another
requiring that the registrar cancel the registration upon independent verification of a third party's
assertion that the registrant breached its obligation to provide or update its contact information. See id.
123. The WIPO proposal may provide some relief to victims ofcyberpiracy. But it is hardly a panacea.
Indeed, WIPO's "proposal" breaks little new ground, as the current NSI registration agreement already
provides that NSI may terminate a customer's right to use its services if the customer's registration
agreement contains false or misleading information. See NS Service Agreement, supra note 28, 19.
Even if implementation of WIPO's more specific proposal results in more faithful, consistent
cancellation of registrations issued under unreliable contact information, it still will not solve the
problem faced by holders of famous trademarks. After all, WIPO declined to recommend a requirement
that the contact information submitted by registrants include a street address instead ofa post office box,
on the theory that "a street address can be as easily misrepresented as a post office box" and that a "large
number of small enterprises operatie] their businesses with the use of a post office box." WIPO Report,
supra note 2, 68. WIPO's arguments are probably accurate as far as they go, but they entirely miss the
significance of a reliable street address as a predicate to initiating litigation by personal service of
process. Thus, even if WIPO's recommendations are executed in a faithful and timely fashion by
domain-name registrars, a cyberpirate may successfully avoid personal service of process of a lawsuit
challenging registration of a domain name, while at the same time avoiding cancellation by the registrar
for submission of unreliable contact information, aimply by providing an accurate post office box
number to the registrar.
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the registered trademarks "Porsche" and "Boxster" (collectively, the
"Porsche Marks"), alleging that such domain names diluted the Porsche
Marks in violation of section 43(c) of the Lanham Act53 (also known as the
Trademark Dilution Act) and praying that the domain names be transferred
or forfeited to Porsche. 4 Pursuant to Porsche's request, NSI deposited the
registry certificates for the domain names into the registry of the court.5
According to the allegations of its Verified Complaint, Porsche
encountered all of the typical cyberabuse problems noted by WIPO. The
domain name PORSCHEPARTS.COM was registered by a cybersquatter
who unabashedly offered the name for sale under the following
advertisement:
P.S. Don't forget, even if you have a web site address in which you
have built equity, the domain: www.porscheparts.com could be a
referring page to your site. This would direct worldwide traffic to your
site and could be extremely valuable to you. Also, even if you sell
parts for other badges, this web address would increase your porche
[sic] business.5 6
The names PORSCHECAR.COM, PORSCHAGIRLS.COM, and
PORSCH.COM directed unwary net surfers to web sites that offered
thousands of hardcore pornographic videos, live sex, and other materials.57
Similarly, the names ALLPORSCHE.COM and CALPORSCHE.COM were
linked to web sites not affiliated, sponsored, or approved by Porsche that
respectively sold parts and accessories for Porsche automobiles and sold
used Porsche automobiles. 8
By proceeding against the infringing domain names directly, Porsche
hoped to avoid the problems associated with pursuing numerous in
personam actions against defendants who would be difficult to identify,
locate, and personally serve with process.5 9 According to the allegations of
53. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (1994).
54. See Verified Complaint $ 1, Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. v. PORSCH.COM, 51 F. Supp. 2d 707
(E.D. Va. 1999) (No. Civ. A. 99-0006-A) [hereinafter Verified Complaint].
55. See Interview with Gregory D. Phillips, Outside Trademark Counsel for Porsche Cars N. Am.,
Inc., in Salt Lake City, Utah (Mar. 22, 1999).
56. Verified Complaint, supra note 54, 22.
57. See id. $ 40.
58. See id. % 44, 50.
59. The magnitude of Porsche's dilemma has only expanded since it filed its initial complaint.
Although Porsche initially named 128 domain names that incorporated some variation on its trademarks,
the current list of cyberpirates includes more than 300 such domain names. See Hearing on
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Porsche's Verified Complaint, some of the domain-name defendants
(PORSCHE944.COM, PORSCHE993.COM, AND PORSCHE996.COM)
were originally registered by an entity that listed a Honduras post office box
as its address and that subsequently sold the names to third parties.' Others of
the domain-name defendants had had their registrations transferred to entities
located in countries such as Iran (for example, PORSCHEDEALERS.COM),
or had been registered by applicants who submitted nonexistent suite
numbers or other fictitious addresses in their application (for example,
PORSCH.COM and PORSCHECAR.COM). 6" On these and other bases, the
district court granted Porsche's motion to proceed without providing
personal service of process to the registrants of the domain names and to
provide notice by first-class mail.
Following Porsche's lead, Bell Atlantic Corp., Bell Atlantic Internet
Solutions, Inc., and NYNEX Corp. (collectively, "Bell Atlantic") filed a
similar in rem action in the same court. Like Porsche, Bell Atlantic asserted
trademark dilution and related claims directly against domain names that
incorporated variations on their trademarks "Bell" and 'NYNEX." Bell
Atlantic also submitted a motion requesting approval to proceed on the
basis of service by mail and by publication, asserting that "personal service
upon the numerous shadowy holders of the deceptive names [at issue was]
wholly impracticable" because the domain-name registrants had "supplied
either false addresses or only a post office box when they registered their
names." 
62
After Porsche submitted notice to the registrants of the allegedly
infringing domain names, the registrant of two of the domain names (the
moving domain names) appeared and filed a motion to dismiss Porsche's
complaint. In support of the motion, the moving domain names argued
(1) that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the
moving domain names were not in actual use; and (2) that the district court
"Cybersquatting" Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 1-3 (1999) (testimony of
Gregory D. Phillips, Outside Trademark Counsel for Porsche Cars N. Am. Inc.) (available at
http:llwww.senate.gov/-judiciaryn72299gdp.htm).
60. See Verified Complaint, supra note 54, 17.
61. See id.
62. Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Motion for an Order to Appear or Plead at 4-5, Porsche
Cars N. Am., Inc. v. PORSCH.COM, 51 F. Supp. 2d 707 (E.D. Va. 1999) (No. Civ. A. 99-0006-A).
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lacked jurisdiction under the Trademark Dilution Act to entertain an in rem
action."
Judge Cacheris of the Eastern District of Virginia rejected the first
argument, but adopted the second. In a memorandum opinion, the Porsche
Cars court first rejected the moving domain names' subject-matter
jurisdiction argument, holding that Porsche's claims were ripe given that
"the mere act of registration [of the domain names] creates an immediate
injury by preventing Porsche from utilizing those domain names itself in
order to channel consumers to its own web site."' But although the court
upheld subject-matter jurisdiction, it held that it lacked "personal juris-
diction over the domain names at issue because the Trademark Dilution Act
does not permit in rem proceedings. 65 In so concluding, the Porsche Cars
court reasoned that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(n) authorized in rem
jurisdiction "only if the Trademark Dilution Act under which Porsche has
sued can be read to permit in rem actions that name the allegedly offending
marks at issue without suing the persons who use them.",
66
Because the Trademark Dilution Act specifies remedies "against another
'person's' commercial use" of a trademark "without including 'marks'
within [its] definition" of "person," the Porsche Cars court concluded that
in rem proceedings were not available under the Act.67 Finally, the court
suggested that its construction of the statute might be necessary to avoid a
constitutional defect, in that entertaining an in rem proceeding under these
circumstances might violate due process.68
III. INREMJURISDICTION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
An evaluation of the applicability of in rem jurisdiction to domain names
in cyberspace requires a clear understanding of the historical origins of such
proceedings. The discussion below traces the history of in rem jurisdiction
under the U.S. Supreme Court's evolving jurisprudence of territorial
jurisdiction.
63. See Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. v. PORSCH.COM, 51 F. Supp. 2d 707, 710 (E.D. Va. 1999).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 711.
66. Id. at 711-12.
67. Id. at 712.
68. See id.
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A. First Principles: Pennoyer v. Neff
Before the revolution inaugurated by the U.S. Supreme Court's decision
in International Shoe Co. v. Washington,69 the extent of a court's territorial
jurisdiction over a controversy hinged primarily on the situs of persons or
property within the forum state. A first-year law student's introduction to
civil procedure usually involves a confrontation with the following "two
well-established principles of public law" as explained in Pennoyer v.
Neff-
70
One of these principles is, that every State possesses exclusive
jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its
territory. As a consequence, every State has the power to determine
for itself the civil status and capacities of its inhabitants... and also
to regulate the manner and conditions upon which property situated
within such territory, both personal and real, may be acquired,
enjoyed, and transferred. The other principle of public law referred to
follows from the one mentioned; that is, that no State can exercise
direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or property without its
territory.
71
The Pennoyer construct, borrowed from international law conceptions of
sovereignty,72 constitutionalized73 the longstanding dichotomy between
actions inpersonam and actions in rem.74
Under Pennoyer, a court could establish territorial power in personam
through the issuance of personal service of process on the defendant while
69. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
70. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
71. I d at 722 (emphasis added).
72. See Philip B. Kurland, The Supreme Court, The Due Process Clause and the In Personam
Jurisdiction ofState Courts-From Pennoyerto Denckla: A Review, 25 U. Chi. L. Rev. 569,585 (1958)
(noting that Pennoyer's framework was "borrowed from laws relating to wholly independent
sovereignties").
73. Pennoyer's constitutionalization ofthe dichotomy involved a certain degree ofanalytical finesse,
given that the Fourteenth Amendment was not ratified until one year after the initial litigation-
originally captioned Mitchell v. Neff-was filed. Thus, Pennoyereitherrules silently that the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applied retroactively, or it is pure dicta.
74. For an historical analysis of the Pennoyer framework, see Kurland, supra note 72. See generally
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. Ct. Rev. 241. For
interesting background on Pennoyer, see Wendy Collins Perdue, Sin, Scandal, and Substantive Due
Process: Personal Jurisdiction and Pennoyer Reconsidered, 62 Wash. L. Rev. 479, 481-90 (1987).
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the defendant was present within the forum State. An in rem proceeding, on
the other hand, involved the exercise of control over property found within
the forum State. In either case, the court was deemed to have territorial
jurisdiction over the dispute by virtue of its control over the person or
property found within its borders.75
Pennoyer also noted the distinction between true in rem proceedings and
quasi in rem proceedings-or, in the words of Justice Field, actions "in the
nature of a proceeding in rem."76 Under the traditional terminology, a true in
rem action is one in which the plaintiff asks the court to "determine[] all
claims that anyone, whether named in the action or not, has to the property
or thing in question. ,77 The effect of a true in rem judgment is to establish
title to the property in question and to foreclose any future claims to it.
78
Examples of true in rem proceedings include admiralty libel actions and
land title registration suits.
79
Quasi in rem actions are of two types. Type I quasi in rem actions differ
from true in rem actions only in that the plaintiff asserts an interest in the
property as against specifically identified individuals and the judgment
affects the rights of those individuals, not the claims of "all the world."8
Examples include actions to quiet title or to foreclose liens. In practice, type
I quasi in rem actions are practically identical to true in rem proceedings;
the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws abandons the distinction
entirely. 81 Type II quasi in rem actions, by contrast, do not involve pre-
existing interests in or claims to the property at all. Instead, the plaintiff in a
type II action seeks to establish an interest in the defendant's property as a
basis for exercising jurisdiction over the defendant when in personam
jurisdiction is unavailable.82 Such actions are sometimes referred to as
attachment proceedings, as the plaintiff typically initiates a type II action by
75. Justice Holmes concisely captured the Pennoyer principle of territoriality in explaining that "[t~he
foundation of jurisdiction is physical power." McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917). For a
comprehensive discussion of the evolution of the Supreme Court's doctrine of territorial jurisdiction
during the middle part of the twentieth century, see generally Kurland, supra note 72.
76. 95 U.S. at 733.
77. 16 James Win. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice 1 108.70[1] (3d ed. 1999); see also
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 6 cmt. a (1982).
78. See 16 Moore et al., supra note 77, $ 108.70[1l.
79. See id.
80. Id.
81. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 66 cmt. a (1971).
82. See 16 Moore et al., supra note 77, T 108.70[2]; see also Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws § 66 cmt. a; Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 6 cmt. a.
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attaching a defendant's property in an attempt to satisfy an unrelated claim
that the defendant owes the plaintiff money.
Pennoyer further clarified the form of notice required under the Due
Process Clause, indicating that the notice requirement turned in large
measure on the in personam or in rem nature of the proceeding. In in
personam actions, "where the entire object of the action is to determine the
personal rights and obligations of the defendants," Pennoyer held that
personal service of process on a defendant within the forum State was
required---"[p]rocess sent to him out of the State, and process published
within it were deemed "equally unavailing in proceedings to establish his
personal liability." 3 In in rem actions, by contrast, Pennoyer acknowledged
that "substituted service" in the form of notice by publication may be
permitted where "property in the State is brought under the control of the
court" at the outset of the litigation.84 This latter requirement was fatal to the
court's jurisdiction in Pennoyer, because the plaintiff had not attached the
defendant's property at the commencement of the action.85
B. Beyond Pennoyer: Territorial Jurisdiction in Transition
Pennoyer's territoriality framework remained relatively intact as long as
"the average person's mobility was limited and territorial notions did not
represent too great an impediment on a plaintiff's ability to institute his
action."86 As "the United States became a mobile, industrialized society,"
however, Pennoyer's territoriality approach came under increasing pressure
and "courts were forced to deviate from its principles and adjust them to the
changing times.
' 7
83. Pennoyer v. Neff 95 U.S. 714, 727 (1877).
84. Id. at 733.
85. See id. at 733-34.
86. 4 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1064 (2d ed. 1987 &
Supp. 1999).
87. Id.; see also Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 617 (1990) (Scalia, J., announcing the
judgment of the Court) ("In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, changes in the technology of
transportation and communication, and the tremendous growth of interstate business activity, led to an
'inevitable relaxation of the strict limits on state jurisdiction' over nonresident individuals and
corporations.") (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 260 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting)); Burk,
Federalism in Cyberspace, supra note 4, at 1107 (arguing that "[t]he personal jurisdiction problems
posed by virtual commerce and Intemet telepresence are in many ways the culmination of a long
evolution of legal doctrine occasioned by changing technology"); Kurland, supra note 72, at 573
(asserting that "[t]he rapid development of transportation and communication in this country demanded a
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Initially, the courts retained the basic framework of Pennoyer but
recognized an increasing number of substitutes for a defendant's presence
within the forum State. A defendant not served or holding property within a
state was deemed subject to suit, for example, on the basis of an individual
defendant's domicile88 in the forum State; or on the ground that a corporate
defendant had a constructive presence within the State;89 or on the
constructive notion that a defendant may be deemed to have impliedly
consented to suit within the State by engaging in certain activity."
Eventually, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that the "fictive"
adjustments that it had made to the law of territorial jurisdiction under
Pennoyer were inadequate.9' Accordingly, beginning with the watershed
case of International Shoe Co. v. Washington,92 the Court began to abandon
the notion that territorial jurisdiction necessarily depends on the presence of
the defendant or its property within the territory of the forum state. In in
personam actions, International Shoe held that a defendant's litigation-
related "minimum contacts" may take the place of physical presence as the
basis for jurisdiction:
Historically the jurisdiction of courts to renderjudgment inpersonam
is grounded on their de facto power over the defendant's person.
Hence his presence within the territorial jurisdiction of a court was
prerequisite to its rendition of ajudgment personally binding on him.
But now that the capias ad respondendum has given way to personal
service of summons or other form of notice, due process requires only
that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he
be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain
revision" of Pennoyer and that although Pennoyer was appropriate "for the age of the 'horse and buggy'
or even for the age of the 'iron horse,"' it "could not serve the era of the airplane, the radio, and the
telephone").
88. See Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932).
89. See Philadelphia & Reading Ry. Co. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264 (1917).
90. See Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935) (upholding constitutionality of
state statute authorizing jurisdiction over nonresident defendants selling securities within state); Hess v.
Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927) (upholding constitutionality of state statute providing that nonresident
motorist using its highways is deemed to have appointed state official as his agent to receive service of
process); St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350 (1882) (upholding constitutionality of requirement that foreign
corporations be deemed to have consented to service of process within state as condition of doing
business there).
91. See Olberding v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 346 U.S. 338, 340-41 (1953).
92. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does
not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."'93
Under the minimum-contacts test that has developed since International
Shoe, a court may exercise jurisdiction over a defendant not served within
the forum State so long as the defendant has "purposefully availed itself of
the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State," such that the
defendant "should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there."" The
Court has also recognized a distinction between "specific" and "general"
jurisdiction, holding that even "isolated and sporadic" contacts may be
sufficient to sustain jurisdiction where the plaintiff's claim arises out of
such contacts, but that more "continuous and systematic" contacts are
necessary to uphold jurisdiction where the plaintiff's claim is unrelated to
the defendant's contacts.95 Finally, the Court has indicated that the extent of
the contacts necessary to satisfy due process may vary depending on
considerations such as the convenience of the forum for resolution of the
parties' dispute and the forum State's interest in protecting its citizens.96
For present purposes, the most significant application ofthe International
Shoe formulation came in the 1977 decision of Shaffer v. Heitner.97 Shaffer
was a shareholder derivative suit against a corporation's directors alleging
that the directors had violated their fiduciary duties to the corporation.98 In
initiating this action, the plaintiff shareholders followed a Delaware statute
that authorized a quasi in rem jurisdiction upon sequestration of an out-of-
state defendant's property within the state." Because Delaware law adopted
the unusual conclusion that the situs of a Delaware corporation's stock was
Delaware (regardless of the situs of the stock certificate or its holder),
plaintiffs attempted to use the constructive sequestration of the stock as a
mechanism to compel the absent defendants to appear in a suit to determine
their personal rights and obligations."° The Shaffer Court held that this
application of quasi in rem jurisdiction failed under International Shoe:
93. Md at316 (citations omitted).
94. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) (quoting Hanson v.
Denekla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)) (other citations omitted).
95. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408,414 (1984).
96. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292.
97. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
98. Seeid at 189-90.
99. See id at 190-91.
100. See id. at 190-92.
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Delaware courts could not exercise jurisdiction over the suit because
defendants' sole contact with the State (ownership of stock in a Delaware
corporation) was unrelated to the lawsuit.'0 '
In arriving at this conclusion, Justice Marshall's opinion for the Court
announced a sweeping dictum: "[T]hat all assertions of state-court
jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in
International Shoe and its progeny."' 2 The Shaffer dictum apparently was
at the heart of the Porsche Cars court's concern as to the constitutionality of
an in rem proceeding under the Lanham Act. The validity of this concern is
evaluated in detail below.
IV. IN REM JURISDICTION OVER DOMAIN NAMES: AN OLD
SOLUTION TO A NEW PROBLEM?
In at least one important sense, the traditional mechanism of an in rem
proceeding seems well suited to the problem of trademark cyberpiracy. The
availability of substitute service has long been recognized as one of the
principal advantages of a proceeding in rem. Actions involving decedents'
estates, bankruptcy, quiet title, and other in rem suits have traditionally been
thought to "require proceedings that can close the door conclusively on all
future disputation" even where the interested parties cannot be identified.0 3
"The traditional device of foreclosing the absentee is notice by
publication": '04
Parties cannot thus, by their seclusion from the means of information,
claim exemption from the laws that control human affairs, and set up a
right to open up all the transactions of the past. The world must move
on. 1
05
101. See id. at 213-15.
102. Id. at 212. In reaching this conclusion, Justice Marshall noted that although International
Shoe had effected a revolution in the law of in personam jurisdiction, "[n]o equally dramatic change
ha[d] occurred" in the law of in rem jurisdiction. Id. at 205. Justice Marshall clearly saw Shaffer as a
platform for expanding the change begun with International Shoe, and his overbroad dictum sought to
ensure that the breadth of the change effected by the decision would be as "dramatic" as possible.
103. Hazard, Jr., supra note 74, at 287.
104. Id.
105. Case of Broderick's Will, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 503,519 (1874); see also Jack H. Friedenthal et al.,
Civil Procedure 116 (3d ed. 1999) (noting that quasi in rem jurisdiction "afforded relatively immobile
creditors some procedural protections against absconding debtors and allowed a state's courts to provide
relief to resident plaintiffs against nonresident tortfeasors without violating another state's territorial
sovereignty through direct assertions of in personam jurisdiction over its residents").
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Trademark holders today increasingly find themselves victimized by
cyberpirates who seek, "by their seclusion from the means of information,"
to exempt themselves "from the laws that control human affairs." An action
in rem was the traditional response to this sort of dilemma, and such a
response should also be appropriate today. Three possible objections to this
approach are examined here: (1) the Porsche Cars court's assertion that in
rem jurisdiction is somehow inconsistent with the language of the Lanham
Act; (2) the concern (not raised expressly by the Porsche Cars court) that a
domain name may not have its "situs" within the judicial district where the
suit is filed; and (3) the district court's suggestion in Porsche Cars that this
application of in rem jurisdiction might violate due process.
A. In Rem Jurisdiction in Federal Court: What Is the Source of
Statutory Authority?
The Porsche Cars court's decision to dismiss Porsche's in rem action
was premised on the conclusion that such proceedings require specific
authorization in the substantive statute governing the parties' claims-here,
the trademark-dilution provisions of the Lanham Act. Specifically, the
Porsche Cars court held that "Rule 4(n)(1) applies only if the Trademark
Dilution Act under which Porsche has sued can be read to permit in
rem actions that name the allegedly offending marks at issue without suing
the persons who use them."' 06 While recognizing that the Trademark
Dilution Act "does not expressly preclude in rem lawsuits," the court
nevertheless dismissed Porsche's complaint in this action on the ground that
the "language [of the statute] speaks strongly in favor of allowing in
personam actions alone."' 7
The Porsche Cars court's analysis misconstrues the very nature of in rem
jurisdiction. A proceeding in rem is not an anomalous action requiring
special statutory authorization to overcome some sort of disfavored status.
Rather, the designation "in rem" is one of two longstanding bases on which
a court traditionally has acquired territorial jurisdiction over a dispute. As
the Fourth Circuit explained in R.M.S. Titanic, Inc. v. Haver,0 8 actions
based on both the "inpersonam" and "in rem" designations "are grounded
106. Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. v. PORSCHLCOM, 51 F. Supp. 2d 707,711-12 (E.D. Va. 1999).
107. Id. at712.
108. 171 F.3d 943 (4th Cir. 1999).
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on the principle that 'every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and
sovereignty over persons and property within its territory.""' 9
Federal courts have a long history of exercising in rem jurisdiction over
cases in admiralty"' and condemnation proceedings."' In 1875, the federal
courts' power to exercise in rem jurisdiction was expanded by a statute
authorizing jurisdiction over actions "to enforce any lien upon or claim to,
or to remove any incumbrance or lien or cloud upon the title to, real or
personal property within the district,"'" so long as the defendant could not
be served within the forum State. Although the statute (now codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1655) does not establish subject-matter jurisdiction in federal
court, it does provide for venue in the district in which the property is
situated and it expressly allows service by publication if personal service is
impracticable."'
The Porsche Cars court should not have been surprised to find that the
Lanham Act generally "speaks only of remedies against 'persons' who
commit trademark dilution,"'" 4 or that "a mark itself logically cannot be
made to pay damages.""' 5 Nor should the court have read the substantive
provisions of the Lanham Act to preclude the procedural tool of an in rem
proceeding to enforce the terms of the statute. The substantive laws
generally (whether in the form of property, tort, contract, or any of an
endless list of statutory provisions) prescribe the rights of persons in
property without identifying a specific right against such property. Whether
under the Lanham Act or under any other statute or common law defining
substantive rights, the rights of persons in property are defined vis-A-vis
other persons.
The fact that property cannot be made to pay damages to plaintiffs is a
general truism, not a peculiarity of the Lanham Act that should be taken as a
rejection of in rem jurisdiction. For example, a party's claim to certain real
109. Id. at 957 (quoting Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877)).
110. See, e.g., In re Louisville Underwriters, 134 U.S. 488 (1890); Atkins v. Disintegrating Co., 85
U.S. (18 Wall.) 272 (1873); Manro v. Almeida, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 473 (1825) (upholding admiralty
jurisdiction based on attachment); Haver, 171 F.3d at 957. See generally Steven F. Friedell & Nicholas
J. Healy, An Introduction to In Rem Jurisdiction and Procedure in the United States, 20 J. Mar. L. &
Com. 55 (1989).
111. See United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372 (1946); Ducket & Co. v. United States, 266
U.S. 149 (1924); United States v. Dunnington, 146 U.S. 338 (1892).
112. Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, 8 Stat. 470 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1655 (1994)).
113. See Greeley v. Lowe, 155 U.S. 58, 72 (1894).
114. Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. v. PORSCH.COM, 51 F. Supp. 2d 707, 712 (E.D. Va. 1999).
115. Id.
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property may arise under the common law of contracts if the party has
entered into an agreement for the purchase of that property. Although the
party's claim in the event of breach would certainly be a claim to the real
property, the remedy prescribed by contract law would arise against the
breaching party, not against the property itself.
The truism that property cannot be made to pay damages should not
preclude persons from invoking the longstanding tool of an in rem
proceeding in vindicating their substantive rights in property. As the
Supreme Court noted in Shaffer, the in rem notion of "jurisdiction over a
thing" has long been understood as merely an "'elliptical way of referring
to jurisdiction over the interests ofpersons in a thing.' A 6 Thus, courts have
never embraced the requirement adopted by the Porsche Cars court: that the
substantive law governing the dispute expressly recognize a specific right
against property.
Contrary to the Porsche Cars court's conclusion, federal statutory and
decisional law do authorize in rem jurisdiction over actions asserting claims
to Internet domain names as violative of the Lanham Act. In focusing
exclusively on the language of the Lanham Act (and in implicitly requiring
an express authorization for an in rem proceeding in the substantive statute
at issue), the Porsche Cars court missed the clear import of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 4(n)(1). As the Advisory Committee Notes make clear,
Rule 4(n)(1) was designed to incorporate the requirements of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1655 or similar provisions bearing on seizures or liens." 7
1. In Rem Jurisdiction Under § 1655
A requirement of an independent authorization for an in rem suit in the
substantive law governing the parties is inconsistent with the plain language
of the statute, which provides an unqualified authorization for in rem
jurisdiction over any "action in a district court to enforce any lien upon or
claim to... real or personal property within the district, where any
defendant can not be served within the State, or does not voluntarily
appear." ' The Porsche Cars court failed to consider the plaintiff's claim
116. Shafferv. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186,207(1977) (quotingRestatement(Second) ofConflict ofLaws
§ 56 introductory note (1971)).
117. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 advisory committee's notes; see also 16 Moore et al., supra note 77,
4.120[1] (noting that Rule 4(n)(1) "was intended to incorporate the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1655").
118. 28 U.S.C. § 1655 (1994) (emphasis added).
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that § 1655 serves as a basis for its in rem action.'" 9 The statute does not
limit itself to state-law claims in diversity or to specific claims under federal
statutes that expressly authorize remedies against property. By the clear
terms of the statute, any claim to property within the district is eligible for
the in rem procedures specified.
Other courts have uniformly interpreted § 1655 in a manner more
consistent with the statute's plain language. The in rem provisions of§ 1655
have been applied in a broad range of cases involving numerous different
kinds of claims, without any suggestion that its application required some
affirmative authorization in the substantive law. 2 The claims to which
§ 1655 has been deemed applicable include a variety of state law claims in
diversity jurisdiction, such as actions to cancel certain stock allegedly
issued illegally to third parties'2 ' and actions to quiet title or to remove a
cloud on the title to property located within the district. 22 Courts have also
applied § 1655 to claims under federal statutes, including actions to enjoin
the enforcement of tax liens against the plaintiff's property,' 23 actions
seeking to impose a trust on property held by the Federal Housing
Administration under the National Housing Act,'24 actions initiating
involuntary bankruptcy proceedings, 25 and actions under the federal
interpleader statute. 26 Although the federal interpleader statute does not
itself sanction the use of in rem procedures such as constructive service of
process, the courts in the interpleader cases nevertheless have found that
application of the plain language of § 1655 is necessary to preclude parties
from undermining the "basic policies underlying interpleader" by "evading
personal service."'' 27 Thus, so long as "the terms of the lien enforcement
119. See Verified Complaint, supra note 54, 28.
120. See 14 Wright & Miller, supra note 86, § 3635 (describing broad range of cases to which § 1655
has been applied); see also supra notes 103-04.
121. See McQuillen v. National Cash Register, 112 F.2d 877, 882 (4th Cir. 1940).
122. See McKinley v. Martin, 722 F. Supp. 697, 699 (D. Wyo. 1989) (quiet title action); First Nat'l
Credit Corp. v. Von Hake, 511 F. Supp. 634, 637 (D. Utah 1981) (same).
123. See Sanders v. Andrews, 121 F. Supp. 584,593 (W.D. Okla. 1954), rev'don othergrounds, 225
F.2d 629 (10th Cir. 1955).
124. See Seven Oaks v. Federal Hous. Admin., 171 F.2d 947, 950 (4th Cir. 1948).
125. See Hollywood Youths, Inc. v. Mistrot, 246 F.2d 399, 399-400 (5th Cir. 1957).
126. See United States v. Estate of Swan, 441 F.2d 1082, 1085-86 (5th Cir. 1971); Guy v. Citizens
Fidelity Bank & Trust Co., 429 F.2d 828, 832 (6th Cir. 1970); Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc. v.
Garmaise, 519 F. Supp. 682, 686-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
127. Estate ofSwan, 441 F.2d at 1085; see also Garmaise, 519 F. Supp. at 687 (concluding that use of
§ 1655 is necessary to "'afford relief to stakeholders in situations in which [interpleader] would be
unavailable due to circumstances beyond their control,"' and to "'prevent a claimant from evading
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statute [§ 1655] have been met,"' 28 courts have approved the use of § 1655
in interpleader actions.'29
Rather than limiting § 1655 suits to cases where the substantive law
independently authorizes in rem actions, courts generally have foreclosed
the statute's terms only where the relief sought by the plaintiff "would bind
the defendant beyond the property in dispute and therefore would be in
personam."'30 Thus, § 1655 has been found unavailable in suits where the
plaintiff seeks a personal judgment of money damages against the
defendant,'.' but it is clearly applicable in "actions in rem against the
[property] itself alleged to have been illegally issued by and to certain of the
defendants."'
132
Indeed, requiring supplemental, substantive authorization for in rem
jurisdiction would eviscerate the broad application of § 1655. Under the
Porsche Cars court's construction, a district court could entertain an action
under § 1655 only after determining that the action is authorized by the
substantive law governing the rights of the parties. Thus, before a court
could hear an action under § 1655 to cancel plaintiff's stock unlawfully
issued by a corporation to a third party, 3 it would have to find an
affirmative grant of authority in the applicable state corporate laws. And
before it could entertain an interpleader proceeding or an action to enjoin
the enforcement of tax liens against a plaintiff's property, it would have to
service t6 the detriment of the stakeholder'") (quoting 7 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur Miller, Federal
Practice andProcedure § 1711 (2d ed. 1987 & Supp. 1999)).
128. Krishna v. Colgate Palmolive Co., No. 90 Civ. 4116, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8912, at *13
(S.D.N.Y. July 2, 1991).
129. See Hollywood Youths, 246 F.2d at 400 (rejecting argument that certain provisions of § 1655
have "no relevance to bankruptcy cases," and finding that "it must be assumed that the whole statute was
intended to apply in the absence of... a conflict or an express exception").
130. 14 Wright & Miller, supra note 86, § 3635.
131. See id.; see also Fabian v. Kennedy, 333 F. Supp. 1001,1006 (N.D.W.Va. 1971) (holding that
claim for damages under executory contract for assignment of minerals is in personam and is not
cognizable under § 1655 where defendant "had no obligation to assign to plaintiffany interest in or title
to... [the] minerals, unless and until ... [a] condition precedent was met," and thus "plaintiff had no
basis for an action to require specific performance to compel assignment of title or interest' but only "an
action of a personal nature" for recovery of damages for breach of contract).
132. McQuillenv. National Cash Register, 112 F.2d 877,879-80 (4th Cir. 1940) (quoting McQuillen
v. National Cash Register, 13 F. Supp. 53 (D. Md. 1935)) (upholding application of § 1655 to suit
challenging legality of stock issuance).
133. The court in McQuillen v. National Cash Register, 13 F. Supp. 53 (D. Md. 1935), assumed
jurisdiction under § 1655 in just such a case without inquiring into whether the applicable state statutes
granted such authority.
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determine that the federal interpleader and tax statutes authorize an in rem
proceeding under those circumstances. As noted above, the courts have
never interpreted § 1655 in that way, and the Porsche Cars court's attempt
at a fundamental overhaul in the longstanding interpretation of the statute
should be reversed.
2. In Rem Jurisdiction and Limitations on Federal Power
The Porsche Cars court's interpretation of § 1655 also undermines a
well-settled canon of construction of the powers of the federal courts. In
Porter v. Warner Holding Co.,' the Supreme Court held:
Unless otherwise provided by statute, all the inherent equitable
powers of the District Court are available for the proper and complete
exercise of [its] jurisdiction.... Moreover, the comprehensiveness of
this equitable jurisdiction is not to be denied or limited in the absence
of a clear and valid legislative command. Unless a statute in so many
words, or by a necessary and inescapable inference, restricts the
court's jurisdiction in equity, the full scope of that jurisdiction is to be
recognized and applied. "The great principles of equity, securing
complete justice, should not be yielded to light inferences, or doubtful
construction."' 35
This canon of construction of federal judicial power embodied in Porter
has also been applied to proceedings under the Lanham Act. In Steele v.
Bulova Watch Co.,1"6 for example, the Supreme Court indicated that the
Lanham Act should be liberally construed to effectuate its important goals
and to "confer[] broad jurisdictional powers upon the courts of the United
States."' 37 Although nothing in the Lanham Act expressly authorized the
federal courts to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over a defendant's
allegedly infringing activities in Mexico, the Steele Court nevertheless held
that the federal courts should be deemed to have jurisdiction over the
assembly of counterfeit watches in Mexico.138 In so holding, the Steele
Court relied on the Lanham Act's expressed intent to broadly "'regulate
134. 328 U.S. 395 (1946).
135. Id. at 398 (quoting Brown v. Swann, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 497, 503 (1836)) (upholding district
court's authority to order restitution of rents collected by landlord in excess of maximums established
under Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, despite statute's failure to authorize such relief).
136. 344 U.S. 280 (1952).
137. Id. at 283.
138. Seeid. at287.
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commerce within the control of Congress by making actionable the
deceptive and misleading use of marks in such commerce"" 39 and on the
statutory directive that federal courts act "'according to the principles of
equity[]' to prevent the violation of any [trademark] registrant's rights.'
40
The Ninth Circuit applied a similar approach in Reebok International,
Ltd. v. Marnatech Enterprises, Inc.4 ' Because "'it is essential that the trial
courts carefully fashion remedies which will take all the economic incentive
out of trademark infringement,'" 42 the Reebok court held that upholding the
trial court's "inherent power" to issue an order freezing defendant's assets
was necessary "to ensure the availability" of "ancillary relief necessary to
accomplish complete justice."'43 Although the remedy sought by the
plaintiff was not expressly provided by statute, the Reebok court followed
Steele in sustaining such power as necessary to ensure trademark protection
under the Lanham Act.
The Porsche Cars court's construction of the Trademark Dilution Act
turned the interpretive canon dictated by Porter, Steele, and Reebok on its
head. Instead of asking whether in rem jurisdiction was expressly
authorized by the Trademark Dilution Act, the Porsche Cars court should
have started with the very different premise under Porter that "[u]nless a
statute in so many words, or by a necessary and inescapable inference,
restricts the court's jurisdiction in equity, the full scope of [federal court]
jurisdiction is to be recognized and applied."'" As the Porsche Cars court
itself acknowledged, nothing in the Trademark Dilution Act affirmatively
rejects the availability of in rem jurisdiction. 45 That concession alone
139. Id. at 283 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1127).
140. Id. at284 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1116); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a) (1994) ("The several courts
vested with jurisdiction of civil actions arising under this chapter shall have power to grant injunctions,
according to the principles of equity and upon such terms as the court may deem reasonable, to prevent
the violation of any right of the registrant ofa mark."); Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc. v. Bucci,
42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1430, 1432 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), aff'd, 152 F.3d 920 (2d Cir. 1997) (enjoining
misappropriation of domain name "WWW.PLANNEDPARENTHOOD.COM" and holding that
"jurisdictional predicate of the Lanham Act is broad and has a sweeping reach).
141. 970 F.2d 552 (9th Cir. 1992).
142. Id. at 559 (quoting Playboy Enter. v. Baccarat Clothing Co., 692 F.2d 1272, 1275 (9th Cir.
1982)).
143. Id. at 560 (quoting FTC v. H.N. Singer, Inc., 668 F.2d 1107, 1113 (9th Cir. 1982)).
144. Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395,398 (1946).
145. See Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. v. PORSCH.COM, 51 F. Supp. 2d 707, 712 (E.D. Va. 1999)
(recognizing that nothing in Lanham Act "expressly preclude[s] in rem lawsuits").
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should have been sufficient to sustain the applicability of § 1655 under the
Porter canon of construction.
The Porsche Cars court could-and should-have gone further. A
liberal construction of the courts' broad jurisdictional powers to fashion
remedies under the Lanham Act would have enabled the court to conclude
that in rem jurisdiction is crucial to a trademark holder's right to protection
against dilution by cyberpirates. As WIPO and others have recognized, the
traditional mechanism of filing a series of inpersonam suits against the far-
flung multitude of pirates that have misappropriated famous marks like
Porsche's into their domain names falls far short of rendering such conduct
unprofitable and of accomplishing "complete justice."'46 The traditional in
personam approach also fails to advance the statutory directive that the
district court act "according to the principles of equity and upon such terms
as the court may deem reasonable" in order to "prevent the violation of any
right of the registrant of a mark.' ' 47 In rem jurisdiction is essential to
assuring the full protection intended by Congress under the Lanham Act,
and the application of § 1655 should be sustained.
3. In Rem Jurisdiction Under the 1999 Lanham Act Amendments
Although the Porsche Cars court's premise is faulty, it still would not
sustain the decision reached below. Even assuming arguendo that in rem
jurisdiction might have been inconsistent with earlier versions of the
Lanham Act, recent amendments to the statute clearly erase any lingering
doubt. In direct response to the district court's ruling, Porsche and other
prominent trademark holders urged Congress to clarify that in rem
jurisdiction is appropriate in trademark actions against cybersquatters.
These efforts culminated in the "Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection
Act," which was signed into law by President Clinton on November 29,
1999.148 The enacted provisions amend the Lanham Act to clarify that the
owner of a trademark may assert a claim for trademark infringement or
dilution against a cybersquatter and expressly provide in rem jurisdiction.'
49
146. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
147. 15U.S.C. § 1116(a)(1994).
148. Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501 (1999).
149. The statute reads:
The owner of a mark may file an in rem civil action against a domain name in thejudicial district in
which the domain name registrar ... is located if-
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The Joint Statement Conference Report that was issued in connection
with these amendments explains that the above in rem provision "attempts
to respond to the problems faced by trademark holders in attempting to
effect personal service of process on cyberpirates."'' 0 Specifically, the in
rem provision responds to the concern that cyperpirates often register
domain names under false names and addresses and often either refuse to
acknowledge the legitimate demands of a trademark holder to stop using an
infringing domain name, or simply respond to an initial demand and then
ignore later efforts to secure compliance of the cyberpirates"'
The Porsche Cars court's decision obviously could not be reached under
these newly enacted amendments. Although the court's call for an
independent in rem authorization in the Lanham Act was baseless, Congress
has now heeded the call and thoroughly undermined the court's foundation
for its conclusion. Indeed, the recent amendments apply retroactively to this
case, as the Act specifies that the above-quoted provision applies "to all
domain names registered before, on, or after the date of the enactment of
this Act."'52 Moreover, the Act clarifies that its express recognition of in
rem jurisdiction is "in addition" to any in rem jurisdiction that "otherwise
exists,"" thus preserving the existence of in rem jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1655. Accordingly, in rem jurisdiction should be deemed proper
under § 1655 or, in the alternative, under the 1999 amendments to the
Lanham Act.
(1) the domain name violates any right of the owner of a mark registered in the Patent and
Trademark Office ... ; and
(2) the court finds that the owner-
(1) is not able to obtain in personam jurisdiction over a person who would have been a
defendant in a civil action under paragraph (1); or
(I) through due diligence was not able to find a person who would have been a defendant in
a civil action under paragraph (1) by-
(aa) sending a notice of the alleged violation and intent to proceed under this paragraph
to the registrant of the domain name at the postal and e-mail address provided by
the registrant to the registrar, and
(bb) publishing notice of the action as the court may direct promptly after filing the
action.
Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 3002, 113 Stat. 1501, 1537 (1999).
150. H.RL Rep. No. 106-464 (1999).
151. Seek).
152. Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 3010, 113 Stat. 1501, 1537 (1999) (emphasis added).
153. Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 3002, 113 Stat. 1501, 1537 (1999).
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B. In Rem Jurisdiction and the Situs ofIntangible Property: Do
Domain Names Have Their Situs Within the Eastern District of
Virginia?
In rem jurisdiction has long required that the res or property at issue have
its situs within the district of the court exercising power over it.'54 Pennoyer
itself reinforced that view in acknowledging state courts' power over
"property situated within its limits."' 5 Section 1655 incorporates this same
prerequisite in empowering the federal courts to entertain actions to enforce
a "claim" to "personal property within the district."'56
The situs requirement presents no analytical difficulty where the res is
real estate or tangible personal property, but courts and commentators
historically have noted that "the problem becomes far more complex" when
intangible property is involved:'57
The type of personal property known to the law as intangible has long
been a source of confusion and uncertainty as reflected by the judicial
decisions and opinions of commentators and text book writers. Since
the beginning of the present century this confusion seems to have
become even worse confounded, and now has reached the point where
almost any theory can find some support in judicial decision or legal
comment.1
5 8
Courts and commentators have also noted that the situs of intangible property
may depend on the legal context in which the situs question arises.59
The analytical confusion noted by the above commentators has never
been resolved as to all forms of intangible property in all legal contexts. But
at least one overarching principle has dominated the case law as to situs of
154. See Baker v. Baker, Eccles & Co., 242 U.S. 394 (1917); Fletcher R. Andrews, Situs of
Intangibles in Suits Against Nonresident Claimants, 49 Yale L.J. 241, 241 n.2 (1940) (asserting that
"[t]he authorities upon this proposition are legion").
155. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 723 (1877).
156. 28 U.S.C. § 1655 (1994).
157. Andrews, supra note 154, at 241.
158. William M. Simmons, Conflict of Laws and Constitutional Law in Respect to Intangibles, 26
Cal. L. Rev. 91, 91 (1938).
159. See 14 Wright & Miller, supra note 86, § 3633 (noting that situs of intangible property "may
depend upon the nature of the intangible and the context in which the question of its situs has arisen");
see also Andrews, supra note 154, at 272.
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intangibles under § 1655, and that principle strongly supports the
conclusion that domain names registered through NSI have their situs in the
Eastern District of Virginia. The federal courts have pragmatically
approached the issue of whether property is within the district under
§ 1655." ° The Supreme Court's and lower courts' treatment of this issue
can be encompassed within and explained by the proposition that intangible
property has its situs within a district if it is within the control and dominion
of an entity that is itself found within that district.
1. The Situs ofIntangibles Under § 1655: Property Controlled by an
Entity Within the District.
Cases that have found intangible property to have its situs within the
forum district have done so on the ground that an entity within the district
has effective control or dominion over the property. A landmark decision
under the predecessor to § 1655 was Jellenik v. Huron Copper Mining
Co.,'6' in which the Court held that stock in a corporation domiciled in a
certain district is personal property having its situs in that district.
162
Plaintiffs in Jellenik filed suit in federal court in Michigan alleging that they
were the rightful owners of certain shares of stock in a Michigan
corporation and that certificates for those shares were improperly and
unlawfully held by Massachusetts citizens. 63 Specifically, plaintiffs
complained that the corporation's directors (Massachusetts citizens) had
fraudulently sold their shares "to themselves individually or to their fellow
conspirators for a mere pittance,"' and demanded a judgment in the form
of an order decreeing "that the pretended sale.., was a nullity" and that
"any cloud upon the title of such stock of the plaintiffs... be removed."'6
Plaintiffs proceeded under the predecessor to § 1655 on the basis that they
sought to "remove an incumbrance or cloud upon the title to certain shares
of the stock of a Michigan corporation."'" The trial court dismissed the
action, concluding that "'the shares of stock in question are not personal
160. See 14 Wright & Miller, supra note 86, § 3633.
161. 177 U.S. 1 (1899).
162. Seeid. at2.
163. See id. at 10.
164. Id. at 5.
165. Id. at 7.
166. Id. at 10.
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property within the district within the purview of the statute of the United
States authorizing the bringing in by publication of notice to non-resident
defendants who assert some right or claim to the property which is the
subject of the suit.',,1
6 7
In reversing the trial court, the Jellenik Court expressly rejected the
formalistic notion that only "tangible personal property" in the "actual
manual possession of some person" is subject to in rem jurisdiction under
the predecessor to § 1655.161 Instead, the Jellenik Court adopted an
approach that indicates that situs under § 1655 hinges on whether the
property in question is under the control of some person that is subject to
the court's jurisdiction.'69
Under Jellenik, the situs of a stockholder's intangible property interest in
corporate stock is the domicile of the corporation. The Court's analysis is
straightforward and pragmatic: because the corporation itself has its
habitation or domicile within the forum State and is subject personally to
the jurisdiction of the court, an order canceling certificates held by the
nonresident holders of the stock certificates and decreeing that plaintiffs are
the true owners of such stock is properly enforceable within the district.
The pragmatic analysis derived in Jellenik has found broad consensus
since it was handed down. 7 ' In analyzing the situs of an intangible property
167. Id. (quoting Jellenik v. Huron Copper Mining Co., 82 F. 778, 779 (W.D. Mich. 1897)).
168. Id. at 14.
169. See id. at 13-14. The Jellenik court stated:
[W]e are of [the] opinion that [the stock] is within Michigan for the purposes of a suit brought there
against the Company-such shareholders being made parties to the suit-to determine whether the
stock is rightfully held by them. The certificates are only evidence of the ownership of the shares,
and the interest represented by the shares is held by the Company for the benefit of the true owner.
As the habitation or domicil of the Company is and must be in the State that created it, the property
represented by its certificates of stock may be deemed to be held by the Company within the State
whose creature it is, whenever it is sought by suit to determine who is its real owner.
It is suggested that the requirement in the act of 1875 that a copy of the order of publication "shall
be served on such absent defendant or defendants, if practicable, wherever found, and also upon the
person or persons in possession or charge of said property, if any there be," is inapplicable here,
because no one in Michigan is alleged in the bill to havepossession of the shares in question. But
the bill does show that the property represented by the certificates of shares is held by a Michigan
corporation which being subject personally to the jurisdiction of the court may be required by a final
decree in a suit brought under the act of March 3, 1875 to cancel such certificates held by persons
outside of the State and regard the plaintiffs as the real owners of the property interest represented
by them.
Id.
170. See Andrews, supra note 154, at 264 (citing cases holding that situs of stock is domicile of
corporation and asserting that "stock should be given a situs at the place where the courts can most
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interest in an insurance policy, for example, federal courts consistently have
held that such property has its situs in the district where the obligor may be
found.' As in the cases involving situs of stock, the courts here reject the
argument that the insurance policies themselves constitute the res for
purposes of the statute and focus instead on the practical question of
whether the court may acquire effective control over the res."2
This same pragmatic approach has found similar application in cases
addressing the situs of intangible rights to payment by creditors or financial
institutions. Although the Supreme Court has acknowledged that the situs of
such property is somewhat artificial, it consistently has held that the
property is located within the district where the debtor or financial
institution may be found. 73 In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court
again underscored the pragmatic nature of the situs analysis under § 1655:
[W]hatever of substance there is must be with the debtor. He and he
only has something in his hands. That something is the res, and gives
character to the action as one in the nature of a proceeding in
rem.... Of course, the debt is the property of the creditor, and
because it is, the law seeks to subject it, as it does other property, to
the payment of his creditors. If it can be done in any other way than
by process against and jurisdiction of his debtor, that way does not
occur to us. 74
effectively deal with if); William Wirt Blume, Actions Quasi in Rem Under Section 1655, Title 28,
U.S.C., 50 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 22 (1951) (noting that both corporate stock and bank deposits "cannot be
'taken over or possessed'... , yet both have been held to be property within the meaning of section
1655").
171. See, e.g., United States v. Brody, 213 F. Supp. 905, 908 (E.D. Pa. 1963), aff'd sub nom.
Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y v. United States, 331 F.2d 29, 34 (Ist Cir. 1964).
172. See Brody, 213 F. Supp. at 908 (holding that "in a non-negotiable policy the instrument itself is
not the vital thing .... Interests in a non-negotiable insurance policy, like interests in any contract, are
incorporeal choses in action. When a court has jurisdiction over the obligor, that is, the insurance
company, it has power effectively to deal with the obligation."), aff'd sub nom. Equitable Life
Assurance, 331 F.2d at 34 (stating that "the phrase 'personal property' in section 1655" must be given
"broad meaning" and that situs of insurance policy is in district where court can "obtain[ ] inpersonam
jurisdiction of the obligor").
173. See, e.g., Chicago, Rock Island &Pac. Ry. Co. v. Sturm, 174 U.S. 710,716 (1899).
174. Id. (emphasis in original); see also Pennington v. Fourth Nat'l Bank, 243 U.S. 269 (1917)
(finding that indebtedness from bank deposits has its situs in district where bank is situated); Goodman
v. Niblack, 102 U.S. 556 (1880) (holding that for purposes of predecessor to § 1655, trust fund had its
situs in district where trust administrator was subject to personal service of process); First Charter Land
Corp. v. Fitzgerald, 643 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir. 1981) (upholding action under § 1655 to establish plaintiff's
interest in certain notes secured by deeds of trust that had previously been assigned to defendant, and
Washington Law Review
2. The Situs ofDomain-Name Registrations Under the Pragmatic
Approach
The pragmatic approach outlined above easily supports the conclusion
that a registrant's property interest in a domain name registered through NSI
has its situs in the Eastern District of Virginia.'75 As with corporate stock,
insurance policies, and debt, the property right created by a domain-name
registration cannot be brought within the actual manual possession of the
court. But that is not the issue under § 1655. Instead, the court should
simply ask whether the property represented by the domain-name
registration is held or controlled by an entity that is found within the forum
State. If the domain-name registration is held by such an entity, the property
itself is also within the forum State, as the entity that holds it may be subject
to an order resolving competing interests in the property.
NSI is found within the Eastern District of Virginia in that it has its
principal place of business in Hemdon, Virginia. Moreover, NSI holds or
controls the domain-name registrations in the same sense in which an
issuing corporation holds stock, an insurance company holds an insurance
policy, or a financial institution holds an account or fund. Because NSI is
found within the Eastern District of Virginia, the court for that district may
issue a decree requiring NSI to cancel the domain-name registrations at
issue and to "regard the plaintiffs as the real owners of the property interest
represented by them."' 76 The Lanham Act authorizes the courts to enjoin
noting that federal courts' "jurisdictional authority" under § 1655 derives from "the authority to
adjudicate property interests," and not necessarily from "the fortuity of having actual possession of a
res") (emphasis in original); Omaha Nat'l Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank, 26 F.2d 884 (8th Cir. 1928)
(upholding suit to enforce equitable title and claim to credit on deposit in Omaha bank branch under
predecessor to § 1655 and holding that such credit had its situs in Omaha).
175. Presumably, a domain name registered in coming months and years through a competing
registrar may have its situs in the district in which those other registrars are located. So long as the
competing registrar maintains control over the domain name in the same sense in which NSI currently
controls them, there is no reason why the analysis presented herein would not assign the situs of a
domain name to the district in which the registrar is located. When those other registrars begin to
confront the problem of cyberpiracy addressed herein, future in rem actions in those districts may
present an opportunity for other courts outside of the Eastern District of Virginia to address the issues
decided by the Porsche Cars court.
176. Jellenikv. Huron CopperMining Co., 177 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1899). The remedy sought by Porsche
is not without precedent. In Worldsport Networks Ltd. v. Artinternet S.A., No. CIV. A. 99-CV-616, 1999
WL 269719 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 28, 1999), the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted an injunction
directing NSI to remove defendants' registration of the domain name WORLDSPORTS.COM and
requiring NSI to register such domain name to plaintiff. Moreover, an injunction transferring the
registration of an infringing domain name to its only rightful owner may be the only effective way for
the court to fulfill its statutory duty to act "according to the principles of equity and upon such terms as
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even innocent complicity in a party's infingement of a trademark."
Moreover, NSI expressly agrees in its domain-name dispute policy that
upon the filing of a civil action related to the registration and use of the
domain name, NSI will "deposit control of the domain name into the
registry of the court," and that it will "abide by those provisions of
temporary or final court orders... directing the disposition of the domain
name."
178
A functional understanding of the operation of the DNS reinforces the
conclusion that domain names have their situs within the Eastern District of
Virginia.179 The DNS is hierarchical. When an Internet surfer attempts to
contact a web site associated with a certain domain name (for example,
PORSCHE.COM), he submits the name through his Internet Service
Provider (ISP)-the bottom rung on the DNS hierarchy. ISPs, in turn,
depend on the information in databases maintained in any of a number of
root servers operated by various governmental, educational, and business
entities.80 Finally, the "A" root server maintained by NSI stands at the top
of the DNS hierarchy. By updating the various other root servers on a daily
basis, the "A" root server ensures that NSI retains control over the function
and value of an assigned domain name."'
Thus, by altering the database in the "A" root server, NSI is able to
cancel a domain-name registration when a registrant breaches its agreement
with NSI (say, by failing to pay its registration fee) or when a court decrees
that a certain registration violates a plaintiff's intellectual property rights in
a trademark."' Because NSI updates the "A" root server on a daily basis,
other root servers and ultimately ISPs rely on NSI for the authoritative
the court may deem reasonable" in order to "prevent the violation of any right of the registrant of a
mark." 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a) (1994).
177. See 15 U.S.C. § 11 14(2)(A) (1994); Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183,
1193 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) ("The Lanham Act itself, 15 U.S.C. § 11 14(2)(a) and (b), recognizes that even
newspapers, magazines and periodicals, as well as printers, maybe enjoined from innocent infringement
of another's mark as to future publication.") (emphasis in original).
178. Domain Name Dispute Policy, supra note 29, 10(b)-(c).
179. The facts that "[t]he Net enables transactions between people who do not know, and in many
cases cannot know, each other's physical location," and that "there is no necessary connection between
an Intemet address and a physical jurisdiction" of a host computer, Johnson & Post, supra note 4, at
1371, need not alter this conclusion. The issue presented concerns the situs of the property represented
by the Internet domain name, not the situs of web surfers or host computers.
180. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text
181. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
182. See NSI Service Agreement, supra note 28, E.
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database of domain names. When NSI alters the "A" root server, its
alterations trickle down the DNS hierarchy and have a very real effect on
the functionality and value of a domain name. In this sense, domain-name
registrations have their situs in the district in which the registrar is found in
the same sense that stock has its situs in the district where the issuing
corporation has its domicile, that insurance policies have their situs in the
district where the obligor insurance company is found, and that funds or
rights to payment have their situs in the district where the debtor financial
institution is found.
183
3. Situs of Intangibles Revisited: Patent and Trademark Cases
A series of lower court cases suggest that patent rights may not have any
situs at all and thus may not be subject to an in rem proceeding under
183. The question of situs of intangibles under Pennoyer has been sometimes controversial. The
controversy has been especially prominent in the context of the situs of a creditor's interest in a debt.
Compare Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905) (upholding quasi in rem type II jurisdiction over
defendant creditor's interest in debt and holding that debt has its situs wherever debtor may be found),
with Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980) (striking down, for lack of"minimum contacts," unusual
quasi in rem procedure under Minnesota law that purported to authorize exercise ofjurisdiction over
defendant insured on basis of"attachment" of insurer's contractual obligation to defend and indemnify
insured, and contending that conclusion that situs of'"debt follows the debtor"' is simply conclusion
"that intangible property has no actual situs, and a debt may be sued on wherever there is jurisdiction
over the debtor").
If the situs of a debt follows the debtor wherever he or she may travel, then quasi in rem type II
jurisdiction may be available "in a forum with which neither [the defendant] nor his activities had any
logical connection." 4 Wright & Miller, supra note 86, § 1071. Seegenerally Joseph Henry Beale, The
Exercise ofJurisdiction In Rem to Compel Payment of a Debt, 27 Harv. L. Rev. 107 (1913) (criticizing
Harris v. Balk). Although this concern may have resonance as to some forms of intangible property, it
should not interfere with the conclusion that a domain name has its situs in the district where the
registrar is located. Unlike a transient debtor, a domain-name registrar will generally have a fixed situs
(so long as situs is defined by physical presence of the registrar and its computer server, and not by the
jurisdiction(s) in which it may be susceptible to personal jurisdiction), so that the fairness concerns noted
above will not materialize. Moreover, it is worth repeating that the in rem jurisdiction at issue here arises
directly out of the registrant's purposeful contact with the registrar.
The conclusion that a domain name has its situs within the Eastern District ofVirginia finds further
support in the 1999 amendments to the Lanham Act, which provide:
In an in rem action under this paragraph, a domain name shall be deemed to have its situs in the
district in which-
(i) the domain name registrar, registry, or other domain name authority that registered or
assigned the domain name is located; or
(ii) documents sufficient to establish control and authority regarding the disposition ofthe
registration and use of the domain name are deposited with the court.
Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 3002, 113 Stat. 1501, 1537 (1999).
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§ 1655. On closer analysis, however, such decisions merely reinforce the
pragmatic approach outlined above and sustain the conclusion that domain-
name registrations are properly understood as being located within the
Eastern District of Virginia.
The seminal patent case is Non-Magnetic Watch Co. v. Association
Horlogere Suisse of Geneve."s In that case, plaintiff sought to invoke the
predecessor of§ 1655 to initiate a type I quasi in rem proceeding to remove
a cloud on the title of certain patents. 5 Because the defendant Swiss
corporation was not present or doing business within the forum State,
plaintiff sought to invoke the federal statute as authority to proceed on the
basis of service by publication. 8 6 Although the Non-Magnetic Watch court
acknowledged that plaintiff's suit sought to settle competing claims to the
title to the patent itself, it concluded that the statute was not applicable in
cases involving intangible property like patent rights:
The various cases which were cited by the complainant's counsel
interpreting this section are concerned either with real property, or
with such tangible personal property as was susceptible of reduction
to actual possession. I cannot satisfy myself that the section covers (or
was intended to cover) such incorporeal and intangible property as a
patent-right, possession of which must of necessity be ideal, not
actual, and which cannot be seized or sold under an execution. 7
In the decades following the decision in Non-Magnetic Watch, courts
have consistently-though not quite unanimously' 8 -- adopted its basic
holding. For the most part, courts have cited Non-Magnetic Watch and its
184. 44 F. 6 (S.D.N.Y. 1890).
185. See id. at 6.
186. See id.
187. Id. at 6-7.
188. Two dissenting views are expressed in the holding in Burpee v. Guggenheim, 226 F. 214 (W.D.
Wash. 1915), and in the dicta in Armstrong v. De Forest, 13 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1926). In Burpee, the
district court upheld, with unfortunately minimal analysis and without a cite toNon-Magnetic Watch or
its progeny, a suit o quiet title to certain machines for making paper bottles and patents for those
machines. Relying on a patent treatise, th  Burpee court held that "[a] court of equity has jurisdiction to
remove a cloud from the title to a patent, where that cloud consists in an express or implied assertion of
adverse ownership or encumbrance" 226 F. at 220 (quotation omitted). Armstrong suggests that the
property "embodied in apatent" owned by a company doing business in Delaware is "legally situated in
the district of Delaware" 13 F.2d at 441.
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progeny without pausing to engage in any independent analysis.'89 When
courts occasionally mention an analytical basis for their conclusion, they
usually reiterate the reasoning of Non-Magnetic Watch: that patent rights
are intangible and cannot be seized or sold under an execution.'
Despite the apparent similarity between a patent right and an Internet
domain name, the above cases do not defeat the applicability of § 1655 to
proceedings like the Porsche and BellAtlantic actions. First, the analysis (if
one can charitably call it that) of the above opinions is questionable on the
merits. If the idea of limiting § 1655 to cases involving tangible property
capable of being physically seized had any currency at the time that Non-
Magnetic Watch was handed down, such an approach was rejected by the
time the Supreme Court decided Jellenik. Jellenik expressly rejected the
notion that only "tangible personal property" in the "actual manual
possession of some person" is subject to in rem jurisdiction under the
predecessor to § 1655.' 9' By adopting the Non-Magnetic Watch holding
without examining its consistency with Jellenik and other decisions cited
above, courts have failed to appreciate the inadequacy of its primary
rationale.
As noted above, the inherent fact that intangible property may not be
physically seized has never been a barrier to the invocation of the in rem
procedures of§ 1655. Like patent rights, intangible property in the form of
corporate stock, insurance policies, and rights to payment cannot be
physically seized and executed by the courts, but courts consistently find
that such property has its situs within the district where the party controlling
such property may be found. Thus, if courts had applied the pragmatic
approach of Jellenik and its progeny instead of blindly adopting the Non-
Magnetic Watch line of cases, they would have come to the conclusion that
property rights in a patent are subject to § 1655 and have their situs within
the district where the patentee is located.
Indeed, at least one court has so held,' 92 another has suggested this
approach in dicta, 93 and a prominent treatise has concluded that the Non-
189. See, e.g., Standard Stoker Co. v. Lower, 46 F.2d 678, 687 (D. Md. 193 1) (quoting Non-Magnetic
Watch extensively); Standard Gas Power Co. v. Standard Gas Power Co., 224 F. 990,991-92 (N.D. Ga.
1915) (quoting Non-Magnetic Watch in its entirety).
190. See Standard Gas, 224 F. at 992 (asserting that patent is not "such property as the court can seize
and act upon as was intended by this law"); see also Standard Stoker, 46 F.2d at 681 (reasoning that
"patent does not give to the patentee anything more than an intangible property interest, namely, the
right to exclude others from the use of the patent").
191. Jellenick v. Huron Copper Mining Co., 177 U.S. 1, 14 (1899).
192. See Burpee, 226 F. at 220.
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Magnetic Watch line of cases is "questionable" on the merits and that the
situs of patent rights "should be wherever the patentee may be located."
194
This approach is properly consistent with the Jellenik line of cases in that
the patentee has control over the patent right and is subject to an order of
the court directing that the patentee's interest be canceled and transferred to
another party.
Second, even assuming arguendo that patent rights are not a proper
subject of a § 1655 proceeding, Internet domain-name registrations are
easily distinguishable and more obviously susceptible to resolution in an in
rem action. The primary objection to subjecting a patent right to an in rem
proceeding is the practical concern that an interest in a patent may not be
effectively "seized or sold" by execution, particularly where "by successive
partial assignments" of the right to use the patent "various assignees might
have relative rights in a number of jurisdictions."'95 In cases of multiple
assignments, the patent cannot be said to have a definite situs in the district
where the patentee resides,'96 and thus a definitive resolution of competing
claims to the patent may not be resolved by a simple order directed at the
patentee.
A similar objection has been raised against the application of § 1655 to
an action to quiet title in a trademark. In Sterling Consulting Corp. v. The
Indian Motorcycle Trademark 97 (the sole decision analyzing this question),
the district court suggested that the "nature of trademark rights does not
lend itself to any sort of definitive in rem declaration" because "a person
does not own a mark per se, and competing rights to a trademark depend on
the nature of each party's use, such as market, locality, type of goods, and
related factors."' 98 Although the Sterling Consulting court's conclusion
seems overbroad, 9 its concern would arise in cases in which a party seeks a
193. See Armstrong, 13 F.2d at 441 (suggesting, without holding, that situs ofpatent right is in state
where patent holder is located).
194. 14 Wright & Miller, supra note 86, § 3633.
195. Standard Stoker, 46 F.2d at 681.
196. See id.
197. No. CIV. A. 97-Z-1643, 1997 WL 827450, at *1 (D. Colo. Sept. 5, 1997).
198. Id.
199. One can imagine a suit in which the dispute is purely over ownership to a registered mark-for
example, one arising out of a disagreement as to the meaning or enforceability of an assignment of a
trademark registration. In such a case, the dispute clearly would lend itself to a definitive in rem
declaration as to which of the competing claimants has per se ownership in the registration. Under those
circumstances, the objection raised by the Sterling Consulting court would disappear, and presumably
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declaration of a right to use a certain mark under certain circumstances .2 '
Because a party's right to use a particular mark will depend largely on
whether such use is likely to cause confusion with another trademark 20' and
because such confusion depends on a wide range of factors such as the
degree of similarity between the competing marks, the extent of competition
between the party and the users of other marks, and many other factors,2 °2
the Sterling Consulting court may have a point in suggesting that such a
claim does not lend itself to a definitive in rem declaration. A district court
might not be able to confer the exclusive right to use of "United" as a
trademark, for example, because multiple uses of "United" in noncom-
petitive geographic areas or marketing channels could coexist without any
likelihood of confusion.23 For that reason, even the holder of a federal
registration in "United" likely would have to confront infringing users of
"United" on a case-by-case basis instead of in a proceeding in rem.
Even if the above objections may carry some weight in the context of
patents and trademarks, they have no application in Internet domain-name
cases like the Porsche and BellAtlantic suits. In contrast to the right to use
a particular trademark, the right to use an Internet domain name clearly does
not depend on a multi-factored inquiry into the nature of competing uses. It
depends only on registration through NSI. One, and only one, person or
entity may use a particular domain name. Peaceful coexistence of the
noncompetitive, nonconfusing uses of the trademark "United" may be
possible, but only one party can use UNITED.COM as a domain name.
A domain name registered through NSI is controlled uniquely by NSI.
There should be no concern that an order directed at NSI would effectively
resolve any competing claims to a particular domain name by canceling the
registration and/or transferring it to the plaintiff. Thus, unlike the trademark
action noted above, Porsche's in rem action involves a claim to the domain
there would be no hurdle to a § 1655 action to resolve the parties' claims- presumably in the district in
which the original registrant is found.
200. Unfortunately, the Sterling Consulting court does not describe the nature of the parties' claims
other than to indicate that the plaintiffsought to "quiet title in the trademark." Sterling Consulting, 1997
WL 827450, at *1.
201. See 15 U.S.C. § 11 14(1)(a) (1994); see also Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763,
768-69 (1992) (holding that it is "undisputed" that liability for unfair competition under Lanham Act
"requires proof of.. . likelihood of confusion").
202. See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. L&L Wings, Inc., 962 F.2d 316, 320 (4th Cir. 1992) (identifying
factors and noting that ultimate statutory inquiry is "likelihood of confusion"); Dieter v. B&H Indus.,
Inc., 880 F.2d 322, 326 (11th Cir. 1989) (stating seven-factor test for determining "likelihood of
confusion").
203. See Johnson & Post, supra note 4, at 1368-69.
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names that easily lends itself to a definitive declaration as to Porsche's right
in the domain names. Although a person may not own a trademark per se,
per se ownership is the very essence of an Internet domain name-only one
person can be the registrant of any particular domain name.
C. In Rem Jurisdiction and Due Process
The Porsche Cars court's final objection to accepting in rem jurisdiction
over this case was its suggestion that such jurisdiction "might violate due
process" and thus could "needlessly call the constitutionality of the
[Lanham Act] into doubt."2°4 Specifically, the Porsche Cars court asserted
that "courts generally cannot exercise in rem jurisdiction to adjudicate the
status of property unless the Due Process Clause would have permitted in
personam jurisdiction over those who have an interest in the res."2 5 Despite
this initial premise, the court stopped short of actually concluding that
accepting jurisdiction under these circumstances would violate due process,
preferring instead to warn that it "might" do so.2" 6 Two issues are inherent
in the constitutional concern expressed by the Porsche Cars court, each of
which is evaluated below: (1) whether International Shoe and its progeny
call into question the traditional exercise of in rem jurisdiction; and
(2) whether the exercise of in rem jurisdiction over Internet domain names
is consistent with due process.
1. In Rem Jurisdiction After International Shoe and Shaffer
In the wake of International Shoe and Shaffer, some commentators
prematurely concluded that Pennoyer's territoriality framework was
"eligible for oblivion."2 7 For some, "the minimum-contacts principle" was
seen as "provid[ing] an adequate general theory of state-court jurisdiction,"
so much so that "[w]e can release Pennoyer's grip on our minds."20
204. Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. v. PORSCH.COM, 51 F. Supp. 2d 707, 712-13 (E.D. Va. 1999).
205. Id. (citing Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 207 (1977)).
206. See id
207. Hazard, Jr., supra note 74, at 281.
208. Id. at 288; see also Atkinson v. Superior Court, 316 P.2d 960, 964-65 (1957) (refusing to
analyze in rem proceeding in terms of situs of intangible property and holding that all jurisdictional
problems should be approached from minimum-contacts perspective); Paul D. Carrington, The Modern
Utility of Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 303 (1963).
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These claims of Pennoyer's demise were greatly (or at least somewhat)
exaggerated. The doctrinal innovation initiated by International Shoe need
not be seen as a wholesale abandonment of the territoriality framework of
Pennoyer. Indeed, the Supreme Court's more recent decision in Burnham v.
Superior Court209 suggests that International Shoe and its progeny are best
understood as supplementing rather than replacing Pennoyer's principles of
territoriality.2"' Under the modem minimum-contacts framework, in other
words, the presence of a defendant (or of a piece of property) within the
forum State is not necessary to a court's exercise of territorial jurisdiction,
but it may continue to be a sufficient condition of such power.2 '
In Burnham, the Court upheld jurisdiction over a defendant served with
process while temporarily within a state for activities unrelated to the suit.
The defendant in Burnham was a New Jersey resident who had traveled to
California to conduct business and to visit his children who had been
brought there by his estranged wife.2" 2 Because the defendant's contacts
with California were unrelated to the divorce suit with which he was served
while in the state, defendant argued that he lacked the requisite minimum
contacts with California to sustain the exercise of general jurisdiction."3
Although no majority opinion emerged in Burnham, the lead opinions
strongly suggest that traditional conceptions of presence may continue to
provide a sufficient basis for territorial jurisdiction-even if presence is not
necessary under International Shoe.
Justice Scalia announced the judgment of the Court and authored an
opinion joined by two Justices in full and one Justice in part. In Justice
Scalia's view, the minimum-contacts test was applicable only when the
traditional "physical presence" requirement had not been met. Physical
presence alone, in Justice Scalia's view, constitutes a sufficient basis for the
exercise of territorial jurisdiction because this basis for jurisdiction is
"[a]mong the most firmly established principles of personal jurisdiction in
American tradition." ' 4 Thus, Justice Scalia expressly rejected defendant's
proposition, "that a defendant's presence in the forum is not only
209. 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
210. See id. at 618.
211. See 4 Wright & Miller, supra note 86, § 1073 ("The effect of Burnham was to preserve the
physical presence principle of Pennoyer v. Neff").
212. See Burnham, 495 U.S. at 608.
213. See id.
214. Id. at 610-11 (demonstrating that "English common-law practice.., sometimes allowed
'transitory' actions, arising out of events outside the country, to be maintained against seemingly
nonresident defendants who were present in England").
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unnecessary to validate novel, nontraditional assertions of jurisdiction, but
is itself no longer sufficient to establish jurisdiction."2 5 In other words,
Justice Scalia concluded that "jurisdiction based on physical presence alone
constitutes due process because it is one of the continuing traditions of our
legal system that define the due process standard of 'traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice."'216
In upholding jurisdiction based on physical presence alone, Justice Scalia
was faced with the apparently contradictory dictum in Shaffer v. Heitner
that "all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to
the standards set forth in International Shoe and its progeny."21 Justice
Scalia conceded that the "basic approach" of his opinion in Burnham
deviated from the framework set forth in Shaffer in that his opinion
"conducted no independent inquiry into the desirability or fairness of the
prevailing in-state service rule" on the rationale that "its validation is its
pedigree," whereas "Shaffer did conduct such an independent inquiry.
2 8
But Justice Scalia pointed out that the Shaffer dictum was just that,219 and
that "Shaffer, like International Shoe, involved jurisdiction over an absent
defendant, and it stands for nothing more than the proposition that when the
'minimum contact' that is a substitute for physical presence consists of
property ownership it must, like other minimum contacts, be related to the
litigation.''22
Justice Scalia's opinion in Burnham seemed to go out of its way to leave
room under Shaffer for the traditional exercise of true in rem jurisdiction. In
an attempt to reconcile the methodology of Shaffer with his own approach,
Justice Scalia noted that Shaffer involved a form of quasi in rem jurisdiction
that was then "engaged in by only a very small minority of the States."'
Specifically, Justice Scalia noted that, in contrast to the exercise of in
personam jurisdiction against a defendant served with process within the
215. Id. at 619.
216. Id.
217. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S.186, 212 (1977).
218. Burnham, 495 U.S. at 621.
219. The same can be said of the Court's next treatment of quasi in rem jurisdiction. See Rush v.
Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 332-33 (1980) (striking down, for lack of "minimum contacts," an aberrant
quasi in rem procedure underMinnesota law that purported to authorize the exercise ofjurisdiction over
defendant insured on the basis of "attachment" of insurer's contractual obligation to defend and
indemnify insured).
220. Burnham, 495 U.S. at 620.
221. Id. at 621-22.
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forum state, "Shaffer may have involved a unique state procedure in one
respect: ... Delaware was the only State that treated the place of
incorporation as the situs of corporate stock when both owner and custodian
were elsewhere.' 22 Thus, although Justice Scalia was willing to accept
Shaffer's evaluation of the fairness of the "perpetuation of ancient forms"
where such forms were "engaged in by only a very small minority of the
States," he maintained that historical acceptance was conclusive where "a
jurisdictional principle is both firmly approved by tradition and still
favored.22 3 "[A] doctrine of personal jurisdiction that dates back to the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment and is still generally observed," in
other words, "unquestionably" satisfies the due process standard in Justice
Scalia's view.224
Justice Scalia's methodology in Burnham strongly supports the
continuing viability of in rem jurisdiction in the International Shoe era.
Pennoyer itself confirmed that the "established principles of personal
jurisdiction in American tradition""22 included inpersonam jurisdiction over
a defendant served with process within the forum State and in rem
jurisdiction over property found in the forum State. And although the
demand for in rem jurisdiction undoubtedly has waned as the minimum-
contacts test has broadened the basis for in personam jurisdiction, there is
no indication that states are abandoning their longstanding authorization of
in rem proceedings.226 If Justice Scalia's approach in Burnham is applied to
an in rem proceeding, the longstanding historical pedigree of in rem
jurisdiction "unquestionably" validates it under the Due Process Clause.
On the other hand, Justice Scalia's opinion in Burnham failed to garner
majority support. Justice White joined the initial parts of Justice Scalia's
opinion and wrote separately to express his view that
[t]he rule allowing jurisdiction to be obtained over a nonresident by
personal service in the forum State, without more, has been and is so
widely accepted throughout this country that I could not possibly
strike it down, either on its face or as applied in this case, on the
222. Id. at 622 n.4 (citing Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 218 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
223. Id. at 622.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 610.
226. In fact, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(n) expressly acknowledges the availability of in rem
proceedings in federal court, either under the terms of 28 U.S.C. § 1655, or under the terms of state
procedures that would apply in the courts of the state where the federal court is sitting. Seesupra notes
129-33 and accompanying text.
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ground that it denies due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment. 1
7
Justice Stevens expressed a similar sentiment in suggesting that "the
historical evidence and consensus identified by Justice Scalia' combined
with other factors to "demonstrate that this is, indeed, a very easy case.""
Justices White and Stevens stopped short, however, of giving unequivocal
support for the proposition that the historical pedigree of the exercise of
transitory jurisdiction was conclusive evidence of its constitutionality. Both
suggested that the Court may have the authority under the Due Process
Clause to examine even traditionally accepted jurisdictional procedures but
that there had been no sufficient showing of arbitrariness and unfairness
under the circumstances of this case. In so concluding, Justices White and
Stevens each seenied anxious to throw a bone both to Justice Scalia and to
Justice Brennan, who (joined by three other Justices) concurred in the
judgment and concluded that although "history is an important factor in
establishing whether a jurisdictional rule satisfies due process require-
ments," it is not "the only factor such that all traditional rules ofjurisdiction
are, ipsofacto, forever constitutional." 29
2. Due Process and In Rem Jurisdiction over Internet Domain Names
Whether or not Justice Scalia's historical presumption ultimately
prevails, however, it seems clear that the exercise of true in remjurisdiction
satisfies the demands of due process. Indeed, the constitutional doubt raised
by the Porsche Cars court is resolved in the very opinion that the court cites
for its concern. Thus, while the Supreme Court in Shaffer generally
suggested that the minimum-contacts test applicable in in personam
proceedings would also apply in some proceedings quasi in rem, the Court
went on to identify several "circumstances in which [the] presence of
property alone might support... jurisdiction consistently with the
requirements of due process." 0 Shaffer expressly held that such
circumstances include cases where "claims to the property itself are the
source of the underlying controversy between the plaintiff and the
227. Burnham, 495 U.S. at 628 (White, J., concurring in part).
228. Id. at 640 (Stevens, J., concurring).
229. Id. at 629 (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
230. 16 Moore etal., supra note 77, 108.80[1] (citing Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186,207-08,
210-11,217, 219 (1977)).
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defendant.""31 Thus, Shaffer itself seems to acknowledge that true in rem
proceedings and type I quasi in rem proceedings, both of which involve
preexisting claims to the property that is the subject res of the lawsuit, have an
independent constitutional basis even in the International Shoe regime.
22
Since Shaffer, numerous courts have exercised in rem jurisdiction in cases
in cases when the plaintiff seeks resolution of competing claims to the
property that is the subject res of the dispute. Where the property is found
within the forum state and other prerequisites to in rem jurisdiction are
satisfied, courts have routinely (if not unanimously) exercised jurisdiction
over competing claims to the property without any hint of a due process
problem.233
Moreover, even a straightforward application of the minimum-contacts test
would sustain the same result. A domain-name registrant's contacts with
Virginia are significant and constitute the core of the trademark holder's claim
under the Trademark Dilution Act: the registrant diluted the holder's
trademarks by voluntarily reaching out to register the domain names through
NSI in Herndon, Virginia. Due process is clearly satisfied where, as here, the
plaintiff's claim asserts an interest in the defendant's property that is situated
231. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 207-08 (1977).
232. One important, contemporaneous commentary on Shaffer acknowledged that Shaffer would not
likely affect true in rem or type I quasi in rem proceedings:
As Justice Marshall's opinion observed, the application of the International Shoe test to in rem and
quasi in rem type-I actions is not likely to produce any dramatic changes. The Court contemplated
serious consequences, however, for the second type of quasi in rem action, in which the attached
property is unrelated to the plaintiff's cause of action.
Linda J. Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 33, 71 (1978).
233. See, e.g., R.M.S. Titanic, Inc. v. Haver, 171 F.3d 943, 957 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that
"personal jurisdiction need not be exercised in a pure in rem proceeding because, in the simplest of
terms, a piece of property and not a person serves as the defendant," and that "[un rem actions only
require that a party seeking an interest in a res bring the res into the custody of the court and provide
reasonable, public notice of its intention to enable others to appear in the action to claim an interest in
the res"); United States v. Four Parcels of Real Property, 893 F.2d 1245, 1249 (1 th Cir. 1990) (holding
that presence of property that is subject of dispute is sufficient contact to support jurisdiction in
government forfeiture action); Chapman v. Vande Bunte, 604 F. Supp. 714, 716-17 (E.D.N.C. 1985)
("In a true in rem proceeding, in order to subject property to a judgment in rem, due process requires
only that the property itself have certain minimum contacts with the territory of the forum such that
maintenance of the proceeding affecting that property, as opposed to a resolution of a dispute between
parties concerning an interest therein, does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice."); 16 Moore et al., supra note 77, 108.80[2][a] ("Presence of property within the forum state,
by itself, generally will be a sufficient basis for jurisdiction in actions to determine interests in that
property."); 4 Wright & Miller, supra note 86, § 1072 (noting that presence of property within state is
itself sufficient contact to satisfy due process "when the property within the state is itself the subject
matter of a dispute," and that "the Shaffer opinion suggests that the Court had no intention to disturb the
assertion ofjurisdiction in in rem or quasi-in-rem actions of this type").
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within the district and where the defendant's contact with the forum state is
the crucial basis for plaintiff's claim. 4
Courts and commentators have expressed concerns as to whether the mere
operation of an Internet web site is sufficient to sustain a finding that the site
operator purposefully directed its activity at "any random state in which a
cyberspace message may be read." 5 But this concern need not be extended to
the in rem context at issue here. The purposeful nature of the contact of
registration stems not from a passive knowledge of activity by a third party,
but from an affirmative act of registration. 36 And although a liberal
conception of purposeful availment based only on knowledge of widespread
use would threaten to subject anyone who maintains an Internet presence to
jurisdiction essentially anywhere, such boundless jurisdiction would not be
the result of the approach proposed here. Instead, a domain-name registrant
would be subject to suits to quiet title to the name in the district in which the
name was registered and controlled.
For these reasons, the district court's concern in the Porsche Cars case for
avoiding constitutionally suspect constructions should have dictated a result
opposite to the one it reached. By suggesting that invocation of in rem
jurisdiction "might" violate due process, the Porsche Cars court has called
into question the constitutionality of 28 U.S.C. § 1655-the statute that is
properly applicable to the jurisdictional question at issue. If a federal court
lacks jurisdiction to resolve the parties' competing claims to a piece of
personal property that is located within its district, then § 1655 is a nullity and
234. See Longv. Baldt, 464 F. Supp. 269,273-74 (D.S.C. 1979) ("The fact that the property situated
in South Carolina figures prominently in a major part of the alleged mismanagement comprising this
cause of action argues strongly for approval of personal jurisdiction on the basis of these contacts
alone.").
235. Counts & Martin, supra note 4, at 1129-30; see also McDonough v. Fallon McElligott Inc., 40
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1826, 1828 (S.D. Cal. 1996) ("Because the Web enables easy world-wide access,
allowing computer interaction via the Web to supply sufficient contacts to establish jurisdiction would
eviscerate the personal jurisdiction requirement as it currently exists; the Court is not willing to take this
step. Thus, the fact that [defendant] has a Web site used by Califomians cannot establish jurisdiction by
itself."); Burk, Federalism in Cyberspace, supra note 4, at 1115-16 (arguing that such liberal
formulation ofpurposeful availment renders criterion a "sham" and threatens to "dictate that users might
'reasonably anticipate' defending a lawsuit essentially anywhere").
236. The conclusion that the registrant acted purposefully and should reasonably have anticipated
being haled into court in the Eastern District of Virginia finds further support in the fact that each
registrant enters into a contract with NSI that provides that the registrant consents to the
"exclusive... jurisdiction and venue of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia, Alexandria Division." NSI Service Agreement, supra note 28, W.
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void under the Due Process Clause.237 As noted in detail above, however,
courts have entertained a broad range of different actions under this statute
over the course of many decades, without any inkling that in rem jurisdiction
over claims to property within the district raises due process concerns. The
constitutional cloud that the Porsche Cars court has placed over § 1655
should be removed to bring this case in line with decades of settled
precedent by rejecting any due process challenge to the statute.
CONCLUSION
Technological innovation has played a prominent role in the evolution of
American law of territorial jurisdiction. Although the territoriality
framework ofPennoyer v. Neffwas thought appropriate "for the age of the
'horse and buggy' or even for the age of the 'iron horse,"' one important
commentary declared that it "could not serve the era of the airplane, the
radio, and the telephone." 8 Thus, for years the Pennoyer construct in
general and the notion of in rem jurisdiction in particular were thought to
have outlived their usefulness and to have been superseded by the
minimum-contacts framework introduced by International Shoe.
The close of the twentieth century has seen the next great technological
innovation as the computer age finds itself quickened by the Internet
237. The district court's concern that some domain-name registrants might "object to having their
interests adjudicated in absentia," Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. v. PORSCH.COM, 51 F. Supp. 2d 707,713
(E.D. Va. 1999), is similarly beside the point. For one thing, the fact that Porsche has proceeded in rem
does not necessarily presuppose any particular form of notice (such as notice by publication), much less
that the registrants' interests in the domain names will be resolved in their absence. More fundamentally,
the form of notice to be provided to the domain-name registrants is simply irrelevant to whether an in
rem proceeding is legally available. If and when a registrant raises an objection to the form of notice
provided, the sufficiency of notice may be evaluated by the district court. Until such objection is raised,
it would be premature to an in rem action on the ground that some registrant may eventually raise an
objection to the form of notice.
238. Kurland, supra note 72, at 573.
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revolution. Once again, principles of territorial jurisdiction have been
stretched by the increased globalization effected by new technology. But
this time, at least one of the problems introduced by this technological
innovation can be effectively addressed simply by reviving the in rem
component of Pennoyer. If competing claims to an Internet domain name
may be resolved by an in rem proceeding in the district in which the domain
name is registered, then the constructive service provisions generally
available in rem may protect trademark holders against infringement and
dilution by cyberpirates who attempt to evade service of process by hiding
their identity and location. In this sense, Pennoyer may not have served "the
era of the airplane, the radio, and the telephone," but it may have an
important role to play in the age of the Internet.
146
